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Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment*
We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous
change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the
average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect
both the mean and dispersion of workers’ productivity through two channels. First, managers
respond to incentives by targeting their efforts towards more able workers, implying that both
the mean and the dispersion increase. Second, managers select out the least able workers,
implying that the mean increases but the dispersion may decrease. In our field experiment
we find that the introduction of managerial performance pay raises both the mean and
dispersion of worker productivity. Analysis of individual level productivity data shows that
managers target their effort towards high ability workers, and the least able workers are less
likely to be selected into employment. These results highlight the interplay between the
provision of managerial incentives and earnings inequality among lower-tier workers.
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Introduction

The last two decades have seen a surge in the popularity of performance pay for individuals in
executive and managerial positions, from CEOs down to middle and lower management (Hall and
Liebman 1998, Hall and Murphy 2003, Oyer and Schaefer 2004). The literature, however, does
not provide much evidence on how managerial performance pay aﬀects firms’ productivity and the
performance of individual workers in lower tiers of the firms’ hierarchy. We present evidence from
a firm level experiment explicitly designed to shed light on these issues. In the experiment we
engineered an exogenous change in managerial incentives by augmenting managers’ fixed wages
with a performance bonus based on the average productivity of workers managed. Importantly,
bottom-tier workers were rewarded according to the same compensation scheme throughout.
In our context, as in most firms, managers can aﬀect average workers productivity through two
channels — (i) they can take actions that aﬀect the productivity of existing workers, and, (ii) they
can aﬀect the identity of the workers selected into employment. We analyze the impact of managerial performance pay on both dimensions of managers’ behavior in a simple theoretical framework.
The theory indicates that, when workers are of heterogeneous ability and managers’ and workers’
eﬀort are complements, the introduction of managerial performance pay makes managers target
their eﬀort towards the most able workers. We label this a ‘targeting eﬀect’ of managerial incentives. In addition, the introduction of managerial performance pay makes managers select the
most able workers into employment. We label this a ‘selection eﬀect’ of managerial incentives.
The theory highlights that targeting and selection aﬀect both the mean and the dispersion of
workers’ productivity. Mean productivity unambiguously raises as managers target the most able
workers and fire the least able. The eﬀect on the dispersion is however ambiguous. On the one
hand, targeting the most able workers exacerbates the natural diﬀerences in ability and leads to
an increase in dispersion. On the other hand, if only more able and hence more similar workers
are selected into employment in the first place, the dispersion of productivity may fall, depending
on the underlying distribution of ability across workers.
Our research design combined with data from personnel records on the daily productivity of
individual workers allows us to provide evidence on how the provision of incentives to managers
aﬀects manager’s behavior and therefore filters through to the performance of individual workers at
lower tiers of the firm hierarchy. We identify the eﬀect of managerial performance pay on average
worker productivity, on the dispersion of workers’ productivity, and use individual productivity
data to separate the targeting and selection eﬀects.
The firm we study is a leading UK producer of soft fruit. Managerial staﬀ belongs to two classes.
The first class consists of a single general manager, the second comprises ten field managers.
Throughout we refer to the general manager as the chief operating oﬃcer (COO), to distinguish
him from the field managers. The bottom tier of the firm hierarchy consists of workers.
2

The main task of the bottom tier workers is to pick fruit. This is a physically strenuous task
and one for which workers are of heterogenous ability. Managers are responsible for field logistics,
most importantly to assign workers to rows of fruit within the field and to monitor workers. In
this context, managerial eﬀort can be targeted to individual workers and is complementary to
worker’s eﬀort. The main task of the COO is to decide which workers are selected to pick fruit
each day, and which are assigned to non-picking tasks. The COO also decides the allocation of
workers and managers to fields. Hence managers and workers do not decide where they work or
whom they work with.
The design of the experiment is as follows. We divided the peak picking season into two
periods of two months each. In the first period the COO and managers were paid a fixed wage.
In the second period, we added a daily performance bonus to the same level of fixed wages. The
performance bonus is an increasing function of the average productivity of workers in the field on
that day, conditional on average productivity being above an exogenously set threshold.
The data has three key features that allow us to identify the consequences of managerial
performance pay on the mean and dispersion of productivity among bottom tier workers, and
the heterogeneous eﬀects across individual workers. First, the change in managerial incentives is
orthogonal to other determinants of the firm’s productivity — we had full control over the timing of
the change, the structure of managerial compensation, and the information provided to managers.
Second, we observe the same workers and managers under both managerial incentive schemes and
therefore control for time invariant sources of heterogeneity across workers, such as their ability,
and across managers, such as their management style.1 Third, we have daily information on the
pool of workers available to pick fruit on that day which allows us to precisely identify the eﬀect of
managerial incentives on the selection of workers. We observe the entire pool of workers because
individuals are hired seasonally from Eastern Europe, and they live on the farm for the duration
of their stay. Importantly, there is typically an excess supply of bottom-tier workers, and work is
oﬀered on a casual basis with no daily guarantee of employment.
The empirical analysis yields six findings. First, the introduction of managerial performance
pay increases the average productivity of lower-tier workers by 21%. Second, the introduction
of managerial performance pay increases the dispersion of productivity among workers — the
coeﬃcient of variation increases by 38%.
Third, the analysis of individual productivity data reveals that the most able workers experience
a significant increase in productivity while the productivity of other workers is not aﬀected or even
decreases. This suggests that the targeting eﬀect is at play — after the introduction of performance
pay, managers target their eﬀort towards more able workers. The introduction of managerial
1

Our empirical strategy is informed by the evidence that individual ‘styles’ of managers aﬀect firm performance
over and above firm level characteristics themselves (Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Malmendier and Tate 2004).
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performance pay thus exacerbates earnings inequality due to underlying diﬀerences in ability.
Fourth, the individual data also provides evidence of a selection eﬀect. More able workers,
namely workers who had the highest productivity when managers were paid fixed wages, are more
likely to be selected into the workforce when managers are paid performance related pay. Least
able workers are employed less often and workers at the bottom of the productivity distribution
are fired. Fifth, we find that the selection and targeting eﬀect reinforce each other, as workers who
experience the highest increase in productivity are also more likely to be selected into employment.
This further exacerbates the raise in earnings inequality among workers.
Finally, we evaluate the relative importance of the targeting and selection eﬀects through a
series of thought experiments. We find that at least half of the 21% increase in average productivity
is driven by the selection of more productive workers. In contrast, we find that the change in
dispersion is nearly entirely due to managers targeting the most able workers after the introduction
of performance pay. Namely, the dispersion of productivity would have increased by almost the
same amount had the selection of workers remained unchanged. The reason is that the distribution
of ability across workers is such that even when the least able workers are fired, the marginal worker
selected to pick is still of relatively low ability. Hence there remains considerable heterogeneity in
productivity among selected workers.
We contribute to the empirical literature on the eﬀects of incentive pay on performance. Our
analysis complements recent evidence on the eﬀects of incentives to bottom-tier workers on their
own or aggregate firm performance (Lazear 2000, Paarsch and Shearer 2000, Jones and Kato
1995), and on the eﬀect of incentive pay for CEOs and managers on aggregate firm performance
(Chevalier and Ellison 1997, Groves et al 1994, Oyer 1998).
Our paper combines both themes as we analyze the eﬀect of managerial incentives on the
productivity of individual workers in lower tiers of the firm’s hierarchy. Using individual level
personnel data at various layers of the firm’s hierarchy, we open the black box of behavior within the
firm and explore the eﬃciency and distributional consequences of the introduction of managerial
incentives. Our findings draw attention to the interplay between the provision of managerial
incentives and earnings inequality among workers. On the methodological front, our experimental
research design allows us to address a key empirical challenge in identifying the causal eﬀects of
incentives on firm or individual performance, namely that observed incentive contracts might be
endogenous to firm’s performance (Prendergast 1999, Chiappori and Salanie 2003).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our context, develops a theoretical framework to analyze the eﬀects of managerial performance pay, and discusses how our experiment is
designed to identify such eﬀects. Section 3 describes the personnel data and presents descriptive
evidence. Section 4 presents evidence on the eﬀect of managerial incentives on the average and
dispersion of workers’ productivity. Section 5 uses the individual level data to identify the het-

4

erogenous eﬀects across workers. Section 6 presents evidence on the selection eﬀects of managerial
incentives. Section 7 concludes. Proofs and robustness checks are provided in the Appendix.

2

Context, Theory, and the Experiment

2.1

Context

The firm we study is a leading UK producer of soft fruit.2 Managerial staﬀ belongs to two classes.
The first class consists of a single general manager, the second comprises ten field managers.
Throughout we refer to the general manager as the chief operating oﬃcer (COO), to distinguish
him from the field managers. The bottom tier of the firm hierarchy consists of workers.
The main task of the bottom-tier workers is to pick fruit. On average, workers pick on two
diﬀerent fields per day. Within a field-day, each worker is allocated their own row of fruit to pick.
A worker’s productivity depends on field conditions, on her eﬀort and on the managerial eﬀort
targeted towards her. The amount of fruit to be picked and hence the number of workers on a
field varies both across fields on any given day because fields vary in their size, and within a field
over time because plants reach maturity at diﬀerent times. There are no complementarities among
workers in picking — each worker’s productivity is independent of the eﬀorts of other bottom-tier
workers. The only choice variable of workers is how much eﬀort to exert into picking. Workers do
not choose how many hours to work — all workers are present on the field-day for the number of
hours it takes to pick all the available fruit.
Workers are organized and supervised by managers, with each manager being responsible for
around twenty workers. Managers on the same field focus on their assigned group of workers and
work independently of each other. Managers are responsible for field logistics. In particular they
are responsible for allocating workers to rows at the start of the day, and for reallocating workers
to new rows once they have finished picking the row they were originally assigned to. If several
workers finish at the same time the manager has to decide whom to reallocate first. Workers place
the fruit they have picked into crates. Managers have to ensure that full crates of fruit are removed
from the rows and new empty crates provided to workers. If several workers simultaneously fill
their crates, the manager chooses whom to help first.
The key choice variable of each manager is how to allocate her eﬀort among her diﬀerent
workers. Managerial eﬀort is complementary to worker’s eﬀort, namely, for a given eﬀort level
of the worker, her productivity is higher the more eﬀort the manager targets towards her. For
example, by assigning her to more plentiful rows and removing her full crates quickly.3
2

The soft fruit industry in the UK is a competitive market on the supply side, with the majority of fruit being
sold directly to supermarkets or market wholesalers.
3
Managerial and worker eﬀort are not substitutes because managers themselves never pick fruit.
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The eﬀect of managerial eﬀort on worker productivity can be substantial. Assuming that
workers pick at a constant speed, if the manager slacks for five minutes every hour and a worker
is left to wait for a new crate for the same amount of time, his productivity would be 5/60=8%
lower. The eﬀort costs to the manager are considerable because the workers she is responsible
for are dispersed over a large area. The median field size in our sample is three hectares. Given
that on the median field-day there are three managers, each manager has to cover an area of one
hectare. This implies that to make sure she notices workers who need to be reallocated to new
rows and crates that need to be replaced, the manager needs to walk continuously around the
field.
Workers and managers are hired seasonally from Eastern Europe and live on the farm.4 Their
work permit allows them to work on other UK farms subject to the approval of the permit agency.
Their outside option to employment at the farm is therefore to return home or to move to another
farm during the season. Individuals are typically not observed moving from picking tasks to
managerial tasks or vice versa. Finally, work is oﬀered on a casual basis with no daily guarantee
of employment. In practice, managers manage each day, and workers are typically engaged in
picking tasks every other day. On other days workers are asked to perform non-picking tasks such
as planting or weeding, or may be left unemployed for the day. Therefore on any given day, there
is an excess supply of workers available for picking.
The COO is a permanent employee of the farm. His main task is to decide which of the
workers present on the farm are selected to pick fruit each day, assigned to non-picking tasks, or
left unemployed for the day. In the event that two fields are operated simultaneously, the COO
allocates workers and managers to fields. Managers and workers do not choose which field to work
on, nor whom they work with. The COO monitors managers to ensure that fields are properly
cleared of fruit. The fruit is planted some years in advance, so the sequence in which fields are
picked over time is determined at the start of the season, and is not decided by the COO.
Workers are paid piece rates. The piece rate is the same for all workers on a given field-day and
is set to minimize the firm’s wage bill each field-day subject to a minimum wage constraint.5 The
piece rate is set so the average worker obtains an hourly wage of w, where w is above the legally
prescribed minimum wage, is chosen by the owner of the firm at the beginning of the season, and
does not change over the season.
In practice, the COO has some discretion to make small adjustments to the piece rate across
4

There are 10 nationalities represented in the data, both genders are equally represented, and individuals are
aged 20 to 25 years. In order to be recruited, individuals must be full-time university students, have at least one
year before graduation, and must return to the same university in the Fall. Workers are not typically hired from
the local labor market due to the seasonality of the work. Very few workers are hired for two consecutive seasons.
5
This is consistent with profit maximization. Given a competitive market for soft fruit, and that the total quantity of fruit available is fixed some years in advance when fruit is actually planted, the firm faces little uncertainty
over its total revenue. In contrast given workers are paid piece rates, the firm’s total wage bill is uncertain.
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field-days as field conditions vary. Let β f t be the piece rate on field f and day t. This is set
according to the following rule;
w
(1)
βf t =
E(yf t )
where E(yf t ) is the expected productivity of the average worker on the field-day.6 Hence the piece
rate is lower whenever productivity is expected to be higher.7
The focus of our experiment is the compensation schemes of managers and the COO. Halfway
through the peak picking season we exogenously change the compensation scheme by adding a fieldday performance bonus to the existing level of managers’ wages. The purpose of the experiment
is twofold. First, we aim to identify the causal eﬀect of managerial incentives on the mean and
dispersion of worker’s productivity. Second, we aim to decompose these aggregate eﬀects into
those that are attributable to the diﬀerential targeting of managerial eﬀort across workers, and
those that are attributable to the diﬀerential selection of workers into picking by the COO.

2.2

Theoretical Framework

We develop a stylized model of the firm to analyze the eﬀect of the introduction of managerial
performance pay on the equilibrium mean and dispersion of workers’ productivity. The model
is tailored to fit our particular context and experimental design. The firm’s hierarchy has three
layers — a COO, managers, and workers. For parsimony and without loss of generality, we assume
there is one manager and three workers. Since in our context there is an excess supply of workers
available for picking tasks, we assume production requires only two workers and one manager in
any given field. The division of tasks is as follows — workers pick fruit, the manager organizes
logistics for each worker, and the COO decides which of the workers pick fruit and which is left
unemployed.
The output of worker i is given by yi = (1 + kmi )ei , where ei is her eﬀort, mi is the managerial
eﬀort targeted towards her, and k > 0 is a measure of the strength of the complementarity
6

At the start of the day the COO inspects each field to be picked. He then forms an expectation of worker
productivity that field-day and sets the piece rate so that a worker with average productivity expects to obtain an
hourly equivalent of w. This piece rate is announced to workers before they start picking, and cannot be revised
ex post. If a worker’s productivity is so low that they earn an hourly equivalent less than the legally prescribed
minimum wage, they are paid a one-oﬀ supplement to ensure they reach the minimum wage. When they first arrive
on the farm, workers are informed that they will be sent home if they consistently need to be paid this supplement.
We observe less than 1% of worker-field-day observations where workers are paid the supplement.
7
This raises concerns of a rachet eﬀect, whereby workers deliberately underperform to keep the piece rate high.
In Bandiera et al (2005) we provide evidence that in this setting, workers are unable to collude in this way. This is
partly driven by the uncertainty they have over where they will work in the future, with whom they will work, and
their inability to monitor workers in other fields. Moreover, given the stochastic nature of agricultural production,
it is diﬃcult for workers to disentangle changes in the piece rate due to changing conditions and those due to
management learning about workers’ true ability (Ickes and Samuelson 1987). Such ratchet concerns have been
documented in firms where productivity shocks are less common such as shoe making (Freeman and Kleiner 2005)
and bricklaying (Roy 1952).
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between the manager’s and worker’s eﬀorts. To make matters concrete, the managerial eﬀort
directed towards a worker can be thought of as the eﬀort the manager devotes to ensuring worker
i is allocated a new row of fruit as soon as she is done picking the current one.8
The productivity of worker i, measured as the kilograms of fruit picked per hour, is defined as
yi /h, where h is the number of hours worked on the field. This is the same for all workers in the
field and so we make the simplifying assumption that h = 1. This implies that in our framework
output and productivity coincide.
The timing of actions is as follows. In the first stage, the COO chooses which two out of
the three workers are selected into picking tasks. In the second stage, the manager and workers
simultaneously choose their eﬀorts. We solve for the equilibrium choices of workers, the manager,
and COO. We then determine the eﬀects on the mean and dispersion of workers’ productivity of
changing the manager and COO’s compensation from fixed wages to performance pay related to
workers’ average productivity.
2.2.1

Workers

Workers are paid piece rates, where the piece rate is β per kilogram fruit picked and is taken as
given by workers. The total pay of worker i is therefore βyi . Worker i has a disutility of eﬀort of
1
θ e2 , where θi captures the heterogeneity across workers, and is interpreted as the inverse of the
2 i i
worker’s innate ability. The utility of a worker is assumed to be linear and additively separable
between pay, βyi , and eﬀort, − 12 θi e2i .
Workers choose their eﬀort taking as given the managerial eﬀort targeted towards them. Each
worker’s maximization problem is;
µ
¶
1 2
max βyi − θi ei .
ei
2

(2)

The first order condition of worker i’s maximization problem yields the worker’s optimal eﬀort;
e∗i =

β(1 + kmi )
.
θi

(3)

Consistent with previous empirical evidence from similar settings, worker eﬀort increases as
the variable component of pay becomes more high powered, as given by an increase in the piece
rate β, and high ability workers choose to exert more eﬀort than low ability workers (Paarsch
and Shearer 1999, Lazear 2000). Workers optimally exert more eﬀort when the managerial eﬀort
targeted towards them increases because managerial and worker eﬀort are complementary in the
8

There may also be a pure public good component to managerial eﬀort which aﬀects all workers. The key
comparisons between the managerial incentive schemes remain qualitatively unchanged in that case.
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production technology.9
2.2.2

The Manager

The manager’s compensation schedule is w + bY , where w is a fixed wage and Y = 12 (yi + yj ) is
the average productivity of the two workers i and j. The parameter b captures the strength of
managerial incentives, namely the variable component of managerial pay which is linearly related
to the average productivity of workers. We assume the manager’s eﬀort choice can either be 0
(low) or 1 (high). The manager chooses high or low eﬀort, and how to allocate her eﬀort between
workers i and j. Eﬀort entails disutility cm, where m = mi + mj , for the manager.
The manager chooses her eﬀort taking as given the eﬀort choices of the workers. The manager’s
maximization problem is;
1
max w + b[(1 + kmi )ei + (1 + kmj )ej ] − cm,
mi , mj
2

(4)

where m ∈ {0, 1}. We then have that;
Lemma 1 (Optimal Manager’s Eﬀort): There exists a unique threshold b̄ such that if
0 ≤ b < b̄ the manager chooses low eﬀort while if b ≥ b̄ the manager chooses high eﬀort. If the
diﬀerence in workers’ ability is suﬃciently large, there is a unique equilibrium where the manager
targets the more able worker.
The benefit of choosing high eﬀort is linearly increasing in b and the disutility of high eﬀort is
constant. If incentives are suﬃciently strong (b is high), the benefit of choosing high eﬀort exceeds
the cost and the manager exerts high eﬀort. In this case, the manager also chooses how to allocate
her eﬀort between the workers. Since the managers’ pay is a linear combination of the output
produced by the two workers, the manager maximizes her payoﬀ by targeting worker i if ei > ej
and vice versa.10
From (3) we see that workers’ eﬀort depends on their ability and the managerial eﬀort targeted
towards them. If the diﬀerence in ability is suﬃciently large, the more able worker always exerts
more eﬀort, regardless of the level of managerial eﬀort. Therefore if workers are suﬃciently heterogeneous, the unique equilibrium outcome is where the manager targets the most able worker.11
9

The piece rate embodies information on field conditions because it is set according to (1). Hence worker’s eﬀort
depends indirectly on field conditions through the piece rate.
10
The results are robust to assuming that the low level of eﬀort is positive. In that case, the manager solves the
allocation problem both for low and high eﬀort.
11
In a more general setting with a production function that is concave in manager and worker eﬀorts, the same
result holds as long as the strength of the complementarity between manager and worker eﬀorts is not decreasing
in the worker’s eﬀort.
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In this case the equilibrium eﬀort levels of the two workers, êi and êj , are;
êi =
êi =

β
θi
β(1+k)
θi

êj =
êj =

β
θj
β
θj

if 0 ≤ b < b̄.
if b ≥ b̄.

(5)

Substituting these values into the production function we have the following result.
Proposition 1 (Targeting): Changing the manager’s compensation scheme from fixed wages
(b = 0) to suﬃciently high powered performance pay (b ≥ b̄) increases both the mean and the
dispersion of workers’ productivity. The dispersion increases in the strength of the complementarity
between manager and worker’s eﬀorts, k.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. Managerial eﬀort increases average productivity
through two channels. First, it enters the production function directly. Second, the worker’s best
response is non-decreasing in managerial eﬀort, as shown by the worker’s optimal eﬀort function
(3). Hence tying managerial pay to average productivity indeed increases average productivity.
The intuition behind why managerial incentive pay increases the dispersion of productivity
is that the manager targets workers to maximize the marginal return to her eﬀort. Given that
managerial and workers’ eﬀorts are complements in production and managerial pay is increasing
in the sum of the two workers’ productivities, Lemma 1 shows that the manager maximizes her
pay by targeting the more able worker. This increases the more able worker’s productivity while
leaving the productivity of the other worker unchanged.
An implication is that with managerial performance pay, the diﬀerences in productivity between
workers that arise naturally because workers are of heterogeneous ability, are exacerbated by the
diﬀerential targeting of managerial eﬀort across workers. The eﬀect of managerial incentives on
the dispersion of productivity, and therefore on the earnings inequality among workers, can be
weakened or reinforced by the selection strategy of the COO, to which we now turn.
2.2.3

The COO

The COO’s compensation schedule is W + BY , where W is a fixed wage and Y is the average
workers’ productivity. The parameter B captures the strength of incentives, namely the variable
component of COO pay which is linearly related to the average productivity of workers.
The COO selects two of the three available workers into employment. We label workers as 1,
2, 3 and assume θ1 < θ2 < θ3 so worker 1 is the most able and worker 3 the least able. We make
the simplifying assumption that the COO does not know the workers’ ability ex ante, but can
exert one unit of eﬀort to learn each worker’s ability. In our context, the COO may learn workers’
ability by analyzing personnel files on workers’ performance for example. We denote the COO’s
eﬀort choice as s ∈ {0, 1}, and his total eﬀort cost as Cs. Hence if the COO chooses to learn each
10

worker’s ability, he is able to creamskim the two most able workers into employment. Otherwise
he chooses each possible pair of workers with equal probability.
To focus on the eﬀect of the COO’s incentives on both the average and the dispersion of
productivity, we assume the manager is paid a fixed wage and thus chooses the low eﬀort level.
The COO then chooses s, taking into account that managerial eﬀort is low and workers’ eﬀorts
are as given in (3). The COO maximization’s problem is;
max W + BE(Y (s)) − Cs
s

(6)

where E(Y (s)) is expected average productivity of the selected workers, and depends on the COO’s
choice on whether to learn the workers’ ability.
Lemma 2 (Optimal COO Eﬀort): There exists a unique threshold B̄ such that if 0 ≤ B < B̄
the COO chooses low eﬀort and hence selects each worker with equal probability. If B ≥ B̄ the
COO chooses high eﬀort and selects the two most able workers.
The benefit of exerting high eﬀort is linearly increasing in B, while the cost of doing so is
constant and equal to C. When incentives are suﬃciently strong, so B is large enough, the benefit
is larger than the cost and the COO exerts high eﬀort. Solving for the mean and the dispersion
of productivity in the two cases yields the following result.
Proposition 2 (Selection): Changing the COO’s compensation scheme from fixed wages
(B = 0) to suﬃciently high powered performance pay (B ≥ B̄) increases workers’ average productivity. If the ability diﬀerence between the least able worker and the two most able is suﬃciently
large, the dispersion of productivity decreases, otherwise it increases.
The eﬀect on average productivity is straightforward. When the COO’s incentives are sufficiently strong, so B ≥ B̄, only the two most able workers contribute to the average. When
0 ≤ B < B̄, all workers — including the least able — are selected with equal probability, and this
reduces the expected average productivity. Note that the selection eﬀect identified here is diﬀerent from the sorting eﬀect of incentive pay identified by Lazear (2000, 2005). Here we show that
when the COO’s pay is suﬃciently sensitive to firm’s performance he changes the way he selects
workers into employment. Thus the introduction of managerial incentives aﬀects the demand for
lower-tier workers. Lazear (2000, 2005) makes the related point that incentive pay aﬀects the
supply of workers, namely when workers or managers are oﬀered incentive pay they self-select into
jobs where they expect their compensation to be higher.
The eﬀect on the dispersion of productivity depends on the distribution of ability among
workers. Intuitively, when B ≥ B̄, the dispersion depends only on the diﬀerence in ability between
workers 1 and 2, given that worker 3 is never selected. In contrast, when 0 ≤ B < B̄ the dispersion
depends on the pairwise diﬀerences between the three possible combination of workers, since all
are selected with equal probability. The comparison of dispersion in the two cases then depends
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on the distribution of ability across workers. If the least able worker is suﬃciently less able than
the other two, creamskimming by the COO results in a pairing of the most similar workers and
thus reduce dispersion.
2.2.4

The Combined Eﬀect of COO’s and Manager’s Performance Pay

In our experiment we changed the compensation scheme of both the manager and the COO by
adding a performance bonus to their existing fixed wage. Namely in the first part of the experiment
b = B = 0, in the second part B > 0, and b > 0. In practice managers were paid the performance
bonus only if average aggregate productivity was above a fixed threshold. For simplicity we here
assume that the threshold is set at zero. Assuming a positive threshold makes the analysis more
cumbersome but leaves the qualitative results unchanged.
The eﬀects on the mean and dispersion of productivity thus depend on the balance of eﬀects
stemming from changes in behavior of the manager and the COO.
Proposition 3 (Targeting and Selection Eﬀects): Changing the COO’s and manager’s
compensation scheme from fixed wages (B = 0, b = 0) to suﬃciently high powered performance
pay (B ≥ B̄, b ≥ b̄) increases average productivity. The eﬀect on the dispersion of productivity
depends on the net eﬀect of targeting by the manager, which is non-negative, and the eﬀect of the
selection by the COO, which is ambiguous. The targeting eﬀect prevails and dispersion increases
when the complementarity between the manager’s and the workers’ eﬀort is suﬃciently strong.
The first part of the result follows immediately from the fact that both the manager and
the COO change their behavior in ways that increase average productivity when they are given
performance pay. The COO increases productivity by choosing more able workers and the manager
increases productivity by exerting more eﬀort and targeting the more able worker.
The second part of the result is less obvious. As the manager targets the most able worker,
dispersion increases. The COO’s actions can either reinforce or oﬀset this eﬀect on the dispersion
depending on the distribution of workers’ ability. In particular, if the selection eﬀect reduces
dispersion, the net eﬀect depends on the balance between the two factors. The positive targeting
eﬀect prevails when the complementarity between the manager and worker’s eﬀort is suﬃciently
strong.
The framework highlights the various economic forces at play when managerial incentives
become tied to workers’ performance. Providing incentives tied to average productivity does indeed
lead to higher average productivity but the prediction on the dispersion of productivity and hence
earnings inequality is ambiguous. Other things equal, if workers are suﬃciently heterogeneous so
managers target only the most able, managerial incentives exacerbate the natural productivity
diﬀerences among workers and dispersion increases. On the other hand, other things equal, if the
COO cream-skims only the most able workers, dispersion may fall. We later present evidence from
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our setting, on which of the targeting and selection eﬀects prevails overall, the relative importance
of each, and the heterogeneous eﬀects across workers.

2.3

The Design of the Experiment

Table 1 shows the design of our experiment. At the start of the 2003 season, workers were paid
piece rates, and the COO and managers were paid a fixed wage. In the experiment we exogenously
changed the compensation schemes of the COO and managers. Midway through the 2003 season,
we added a performance bonus to the same level of fixed wages. The experiment left the structure
of the compensation scheme of bottom-tier workers unchanged — workers were paid piece rates
throughout the 2003 season.12
The COO and managers did not know that they were taking part in an experiment and that the
data would be used for scientific research. As such, our experiment is a natural field experiment
according to the taxonomy developed by Harrison and List (2004). The COO and managers were
aware that productivity data were recorded and kept by the owner, and that the data would be
analyzed to improve the firms’ eﬃciency.
The bonus payment was awarded on field f and day t if the average productivity of the bottomtier workers on the field-day, Y f t , exceeded an exogenously fixed threshold, Y ∗ .13,14 Conditional on
reaching the threshold, the total monetary value of the bonus payment available to the managers
on field-day f t, B(Y f t ) increases at an increasing rate in the average field-day productivity. The
bonus payment schedule is piecewise linear;
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(7)

The change in managerial incentives was announced to the COO and managers a week in advance of the
actual change. During this week, we spent time going through numerical examples with management to make sure
they understood how the performance bonus would be calculated. Workers were not informed of the change in
managerial compensation, but given that managers and workers live on the farm, they are likely to have understood
the change over time.
13
We do not claim that this is the optimal managerial compensation scheme. However, these types of performance
threshold are commonly observed in executive compensation contracts (Murphy 1999). Zhou and Swan (2003)
develop a principal-agent model that makes precise the conditions under which such linear performance threshold
contracts are optimal.
14
To avoid multi-tasking concerns (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), the performance bonus was not awarded if
the quality of fruit picking declined. Quality is measured in two ways. First is simply the quantity of damaged
fruit. Second, fruit has to be classified as either suitable for market or supermarket. This classification is largely
based on the size of each fruit. If the percentage of damaged or misclassified fruit rose by more than 2% of a
pre-established norm, then the performance bonus was not awarded that field-day.
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where ai , bi and ci are constants such that a3 < a2 < a1 , b3 > b2 > b1 , c2 > c1 .15 This reflects the
fact that the marginal cost of supplying managerial eﬀort is increasing. Each manager obtains an
equal share of the bonus payment generated on the field-day. If there are Mf t managers present,
then each obtains a payment of M1f t B(Y f t ).
Each manager’s bonus payment depends only on the fields that she has worked on that day.
In contrast, the COO eﬀectively works on every field each day. The daily bonus payment that
accrues to the COO for any given field is 1.5 times that which accrues to a manager on the field.
The COO’s daily bonus payment is the sum of these payments across all fields operated that day
and is therefore given by;
P 1
B(Y f t ).
1.5 f
Mf t
The fraction of field-days on which the bonus was earned varies from 20 to 50% across managers.
The ex post monetary value of the performance bonus to managers is substantial. Averaged
across all field-days actually worked under the bonus, managerial hourly earnings increased by
7%. Conditional on obtaining the bonus, managerial hourly earnings increased by 25%. The true
expected hourly earnings increase to managers of the performance bonus scheme lies between these
two bounds.16
Our experimental design allows us to address two key concerns. First, in our context managers
live and work on the farm and therefore each manager is aware of the compensation scheme oﬀered
to other managers. This raises the possibility of contamination eﬀects if diﬀerent managers were
contemporaneously paid according to diﬀerent compensation schemes. For example, those managers paid fixed wages throughout may become de-motivated, leading us to overestimate the causal
eﬀect of managerial performance pay on workers’ productivity. To prevent such contamination
eﬀects arising, we oﬀer all managers the same pay scheme at any given point in time.
Second, in our context there are a small number of managers and their behavior is analyzed
only for one season. Hence unobservable heterogeneity among managers is a more important
determinant of productivity than unobservable time varying factors. Our design allows us to
compare the same manager under the two schemes and we are thus able to control for time
invariant sources of unobserved heterogeneity across managers such as their management style or
motivational skills.17
15
The parameters ai , bi , and ci are set such that B(Y f t ) is a continuous and convex function. The actual values
of ai , bi , ci , and Y ∗ cannot be provided due to confidentiality reasons. We later provide details on the fraction of
field-days on which the performance bonus was achieved.
16
Given that managers are from Eastern Europe, their base pay is 20% higher than the UK minimum wage,
and that most individuals save earnings to spend later in their home country, these increases in hourly earnings
translate into large increases in real income. As of January 2003, gross monthly earnings at the UK minimum wage
(∈1105) are 5 times as high as at the minimum wage in Poland (∈201), where 40% of managers come from, and
almost 20 times higher than in Bulgaria (∈56), where 29% of managers come from.
17
The alternative design where one gives the treatment to a random group of managers would, with few managers,
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3
3.1

Data and Descriptive Evidence
The Data

We exploit the firm’s personnel records which contain information on each worker’s productivity
for each field-day they pick fruit. Productivity is defined as kilograms of fruit picked per hour
and is electronically recorded with little measurement error. Personnel records also allow us to
identify all the workers and managers present each field-day.
Throughout, we analyze data on the main fruit type grown on the farm, and focus on the main
site on the farm during the peak picking season from May 1st until August 31st.18 To compare
the eﬀects of managerial incentives on the same pool of workers, we restrict the sample to workers
that were available for work at least three weeks either side of the change in managerial incentives.
Similarly, we restrict the sample to fields that were operated for at least one week either side of the
change in managerial incentives to compare the eﬀects of managerial incentives within the same
set of fields. The final sample contains 247 field-days and 9897 worker-field-day observations. This
covers 13 fields, one COO, 10 managers, 197 workers, and 95 days. As part of our experimental
design, the change in managerial incentives occurs midway through the peak season so that there
are 44 days in the pre-bonus period and 51 days in the post-bonus period.

3.2

Data Description

The top panel of Figure 1 shows the time series for worker productivity, averaged over all workers
each day, for the 2003 picking season. Average productivity was somewhat declining in the prebonus period, rose after the introduction of performance bonuses, and remained at this higher
level throughout the remainder of the season.
Identification of any causal eﬀect of the change in managerial incentives on productivity is
confounded if there is any natural time trend in productivity. To begin to address such concerns,
the lower panel of Figure 1 shows the comparable time series for the 2004 season, when managers
and the COO were paid the same level of fixed wages throughout and no performance bonus
scheme was in place.19 In 2004 aggregate productivity again declines in the first half of the season
and then remains at the same level throughout the second half of the season.20
be unlikely to yield observationally equivalent groups of treated and untreated managers.
18
Fields are located on two sites on the farm, of which we only use the largest for the analysis as fruit in the
smaller site began to ripen only after the introduction of the performance bonus scheme.
19
We were only able to present our findings on the causal eﬀect of the performance bonus to the farm management
shortly before the beginning of the 2004 season. Due to technical constraints, at that point they could not adjust
their personnel practices to incorporate performance bonus calculations. Given the success of the scheme however,
the farm has implemented a performance bonus scheme in 2005.
20
Both time series in Figure 1 average the productivity of workers in diﬀerent fields. Hence these aggregate series
are in part driven by changes in the composition of fields over time. This composition eﬀect explains the downward
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Table 2 provides descriptive evidence on worker level productivity in 2003 and 2004. Column
1 shows that on average, workers’ productivity in the first half of 2003 when managers are paid
fixed wages is 8.37 kg/hr. The corresponding figure for 2004 is similar. Column 2 shows that in
the second half of the 2003 season when managers are paid performance bonuses, productivity
significantly rises by 25% to 10.4 kg/hr. In contrast, in the second half of the 2004 season worker
productivity remains almost unchanged.21
As discussed in Section 2, any causal eﬀect of the change in managerial incentives on worker
productivity in 2003 can potentially be ascribed to two mechanisms — a targeting eﬀect and a
selection eﬀect. To begin to provide descriptive evidence on these mechanisms, we first note that
in the second half of the 2003 season when managers are paid performance bonuses, only 130 out
of the 197 workers continue to pick. The remaining 67 workers are ‘fired’ from picking and either
allocated to non-picking tasks or left unemployed for some days. In contrast, at the corresponding
time of the season in 2004, no workers are fired. All workers who pick in the first half of the season
continue to do so in the second half of the season.
Columns 3 and 4 divide workers in the 2003 season into two groups: those who continue to pick
after the introduction of managerial performance pay and those who are fired. We note that when
managers are paid fixed wages the fired workers are less productive than the selected workers. This
suggests management can identify the most productive workers, and it is these individuals that
are selected to pick when managerial performance bonuses are introduced. Finally, comparing
Columns 3 and 5 we see that among the selected workers, productivity increases by 22% from
8.52kg/hr to 10.4kg/hr when managerial performance bonuses are introduced. This suggests the
increase in overall productivity shown in Columns 1 and 2, is not only driven by the selection
of better workers, but also because the managerial eﬀort towards those selected workers changes
when performance bonuses are introduced.
To help shed light on whether managers target their eﬀort diﬀerentially across selected workers,
Table 2 then provides evidence on the between and within worker variation in productivity. In
2003, the variation in productivity both between and within workers significantly increases when
performance bonuses are introduced. Workers become more dissimilar to each other in terms of
their productivity over time, and the performance of a given worker over time also becomes more
variable.
In contrast in 2004, the variation in productivity declines over time. The variation between
trend in productivity in the first half of both seasons — the most productive fields are picked early in the season.
Our empirical analysis controls for diﬀerences in the level of productivity across fields by including field fixed eﬀects
throughout.
21
Farm management also provided us information on what they had expected productivity to be on a subset of
fields each week of the 2003 season. These expectations were formed before the start of the 2003 season, and before
they were aware of the design of the field experiment. Productivity was projected to be 9.06kg/hr in the pre-bonus
period and 8.99kg/hr in the post-bonus period.
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workers declines presumably because diﬀerences in picking experience become less relevant for
diﬀerences in productivity later in the season. The variation in productivity within a worker
might also decline because the productivity of a worker with more experience is less sensitive to
daily shocks in field conditions.
To illustrate the eﬀect of managerial incentives on the whole distribution of worker’s productivity, Figure 2a shows the kernel density estimate of worker productivity by managerial incentive
scheme. This is calculated for those workers that are selected to pick under both managerial
incentive schemes, and is therefore purged of any selection eﬀect. Two points are of note. First,
in line with Table 2, among selected workers, average productivity increases. Second, the variance
of productivity among selected workers increases both because some selected workers have lower
productivity on average when their managers are paid performance bonuses, and others have on
average higher productivity.
To highlight the eﬀect of managerial incentives on the productivity of each worker, Figure 2b
plots each worker’s average productivity when managers are paid fixed wages, against average
productivity when managers are paid performance bonuses. Each observation is weighted by the
number of times the worker is selected to pick under the performance bonus and a larger bubble
identifies a worker who is selected more often.
Two points are of note. First, Figure 2b shows the heterogeneous eﬀects across workers —
some workers have higher productivity with the change in managerial incentives, others have
lower productivity. Second, those workers that experience an increase in their productivity (and
so lie above the 45◦ line), are those workers that pick more frequently under the performance
bonus. However, even among the selected workers, there remains considerable heterogeneity in
the frequency with which they are selected to pick.
Table 3 provides further descriptives by managerial incentive scheme. The first panel shows
that the increase in worker productivity is driven by workers picking the same quantity of fruit
each field-day, but in less time. This is as expected given that fruit is planted some years in
advance, so the total quantity of fruit available is exogenous to the current incentive scheme.
The Table also shows that worker’s hourly earnings are left almost unchanged throughout
the season. Empirically we therefore provide an estimate of the eﬀect of managerial incentives
on worker productivity holding constant workers’ income. As productivity rises by 22%, then in
order to minimize the wage bill subject to the same minimum wage constraint, the piece rate has
to fall. Table 3 indeed confirms that the piece rate unconditionally falls by 23%. In the Appendix
we present evidence that the magnitude of this fall is explained by the introduction of performance
bonuses. Following the introduction of the bonus, the COO, over 9 days, revises his expectation
of worker productivity and sets a lower piece rate thereafter. This provides evidence that the
COO does not attempt to game the bonus scheme by increasing the piece rate above the level
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that minimizes the wage bill. This is as expected given that the wage bill is easily observable by
the owner of the firm.
It is important to stress that the increase in worker productivity is not due to an increase
in the piece rate, as piece rates are actually lower after the introduction of the bonus. In the
absence of large income eﬀects, we therefore expect workers to exert less eﬀort in the second half
of the season, all else equal (Paarsch and Shearer 1999, Lazear 2000). Hence any estimated eﬀect
of performance bonuses on worker productivity, provides a lower bound on the causal eﬀect of
managerial performance bonuses holding constant the piece rate of workers.22
The final panel of Table 3 provides information on the number of workers and managers per
field-day, and the ratio of the two. The number of workers declines by 29% after the introduction
of performance incentives. As each worker’s productivity has risen and the quantity of fruit
available to pick is unchanged, fewer workers are needed to perform the same task. The number
of managers on the field-day declines in proportion to the number of workers so the ratio of the
two is unchanged. Therefore each managers span of control remains at close to 20 workers, so
that managers have to allocate their eﬀort across the same number of workers within a field-day
throughout the season.

4
4.1

Aggregate Eﬀects on Workers’ Performance
Average Productivity

To begin with we investigate the eﬀect of the change in managerial incentives on average field-day
productivity, as this is the measure on which performance bonus payments are based. We estimate
the following panel data specification;
yf t = λf + γBt + ηZf t +

P

μs Ssf t + εf t ,

(8)

s∈Mf t

where yf t is the log of average productivity of workers on field f on day t, Bt is a dummy equal
to one after the performance bonus is introduced, and zero otherwise. The λf are field fixed
eﬀects which capture permanent diﬀerences in the level of productivity across fields. The Zf t are
time-varying field characteristics measured in logs. These include the average picking experience
22

Given workers cannot choose the hours they pick for, they do not face a standard trade-oﬀ between leisure and
income and so income targeting is unlikely to explain their behavior. We later exploit the delay in the change in
the piece rate once performance bonuses are introduced to provide further evidence against the income targeting
hypothesis. Other analyses of income targeting in diﬀerent settings reach mixed conclusions. Camerer et al (1997)
find that New York cab drivers work fewer hours when the observed daily wage is higher and interpret this as
evidence in favour of income targeting. However, Farber (2004) presents evidence against income targeting by cab
drivers.
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of workers, and the field’s life cycle, defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total
number of days the field is picked over the season. This captures the natural within-field trend in
productivity as fields deplete over time. We also include a time trend to capture learning by farm
management and aggregate trends in productivity.23 Ssf t is a dummy equal to one if manager s
works on field f on day t, and zero otherwise, and Mf t is the set of managers that work on the
field-day. We allow the error terms εf t to follow an AR(1) process, and given that the dependent
variable is a mean, all observations are weighted by the number of workers on the field-day.24
The parameter of interest is the coeﬃcient on the performance bonus dummy, γ. This captures
in reduced form the eﬀect of the change in managerial incentives on average worker productivity
at the field-day level. More precisely, this measures a combination of two eﬀects — (i) the change in
managerial eﬀort targeted towards selected workers; (ii) the eﬀect of the COO selecting diﬀerent
workers into the workforce. We expect both eﬀects to work in the same direction of increasing
average productivity on the field-day.
The first two columns of Table 4 report OLS estimates of (8). Column 1 only controls for
the bonus dummy. Productivity is significantly higher after performance bonuses are introduced.
Column 2 shows this result is robust to conditioning on field fixed eﬀects, workers’ picking experience, the field life cycle and a time trend.25 The signs of the coeﬃcients on these controls
make intuitive sense. There are positive returns to picking experience, and productivity naturally
declines later in a field’s life cycle. There is no aggregate trend in productivity at the farm level,
which is consistent with the farm’s practice to stagger fields to ensure a constant yield throughout
the peak season.
The estimates indicate that average productivity increases by 21% after the bonus is introduced.
In comparison, a one standard deviation increase in a field’s life cycle decreases productivity by
22%, and a one standard deviation increase in the average picking experience of workers increases
productivity by 18%. This suggests the introduction of performance bonuses has an economically
as well as statistically significant eﬀect on average productivity.
Column 3 shows that the coeﬃcients are very similar when the same specification is estimated
allowing for field-specific AR(1) error terms. The specification in Column 4 controls for manager
fixed eﬀects. These can be separately identified from the field fixed eﬀects because a given manager
does not always work on the same field, and capture all time invariant sources of heterogeneity
23

As fields are operated on at diﬀerent parts of the season, and not all workers pick each day, the eﬀects of the
field life cycle and workers’ picking experience can be separately identified from the eﬀect of the time trend.
24
Therefore εf t = ρεf t−1 + uf t where uf t is a classical disturbance term. We control for autocorrelation by
estimating a Prais-Winsten regression. This estimator is consistent and performs well in short time series and
trended data relative to other estimators (Doran and Griﬃths 1983).
25
To the extent that the COO selects more experienced workers after the introduction of the bonus, this eﬀect is
captured by the experience variable rather than the bonus dummy. In practice, by the time performance bonuses
have been introduced, the marginal return to experience is low for most workers. Thus the estimated eﬀect of the
bonus is quantitatively similar regardless of whether we control for average workers’ experience.
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across managers. We find that the magnitude and significance of the previous controls remain
similar to those in Column 3. Moreover, the manager fixed eﬀects are jointly significant at the 1%
significance level suggesting that, as expected, the middle-tier of managers have significant eﬀects
on workers’ productivity.
To provide more direct evidence that the behavior of managers changes with the introduction
of performance bonuses, we next include a set of interactions between each manager’s fixed eﬀect
and the performance bonus dummy and so estimate;26
yf t = λf + ηZf t +

P

s∈Mf t

ς s (Bt × Ssf t ) +

P

μs Ssf t + εf t .

(9)

s∈Mf t

The interaction terms are positive and jointly significant. Weighting each interaction term by
the number of field-days manager s works under the performance bonus, we find the weighted
average eﬀect of managers’ fixed eﬀects on the log of workers’ average productivity is .261, and
is significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 2% significance level. This suggests managers change
behavior with the introduction of the performance bonus and this leads to a significant increase
in average productivity.
The final specification explores whether the baseline results are robust to controlling for the
number of days the bonus has been in place for, or equivalently, allowing the bonus dummy to be
interacted with the time trend. The result in Column 5 shows the time trend does not vary over
the two halves of the season. This indicates the eﬀect of the bonus is long lasting, namely the
bonus dummy is not just picking up a short run change in behavior.27
We also performed a series of further robustness checks. First, the baseline results in Column 4
are also robust to alternative functional forms such as allowing the controls to enter in levels rather
than logs, and allowing for a non-linear eﬀect of the field life cycle. Second, the baseline results
are robust to controlling for other time varying variables such as meteorological conditions and
the average experience of managers on the field-day. Third, the results are robust to controlling
for changes in the composition of non-picking tasks over time by restricting the sample to workers
who are exclusively assigned to picking tasks on a given day.
A final concern is that the increase in average productivity may be due solely to workers
changing their behavior rather than managers reacting to the change in incentives. For example
this may be the case if workers have an income target and work harder because, following the
introduction of the performance bonus, the piece rate falls. To address this concern we exploit
the fact that for the first 9 days in the post-bonus period, corresponding to 20% of days in the
26

The performance bonus dummy is itself dropped so the interaction term can be defined for every manager.
This specification also helps rule out that the performance bonus dummy is picking up workers’ and managers’ career concerns that lead them to exert more eﬀort later in the season, when they might believe that good
performance has greater influence over them being rehired the following season.
27
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post-bonus sample, the piece rate was not significantly diﬀerent from that under the fixed wage
regime. If our findings were due to income targeting, we should find no eﬀect of the introduction
of the bonus for the first 9 days when the piece rate remains at its pre-bonus level. However
estimates of our baseline specification when we restrict the post-bonus sample to the first 9 days,
shows the magnitude of the performance bonus on average productivity is comparable to that in
the sample as a whole.

4.2

The Dispersion of Productivity

We now analyze the eﬀect of the introduction of managerial performance bonuses on the dispersion
of workers’ productivity within a field-day. We estimate;
cvf t = λf + γBt + ηZf t +

P

μs Ssf t + uif t ,

(10)

s∈Mf t

where cvf t is the log of the coeﬃcient of variation of productivity of workers on field f on day t.
To account for workers becoming more heterogenous to each other in their experience over time,
we control for the log of the coeﬃcient of variation of worker’s picking experience on the field-day.
Similarly, the variation in fruit available between rows within a field may increase over time so we
control for the log of the field life cycle. Table 5 presents estimates of (10) following a similar set
of specifications as in Table 4.
The parameter of interest is the coeﬃcient on the performance bonus dummy, γ. This captures
in reduced form the eﬀect of the change in managerial incentives on the dispersion in worker
productivity at the field-day level. More precisely, this measures a combination of two eﬀects —
(i) for a given set of selected workers, managers have incentives to diﬀerentially target their eﬀort
across workers which increases the dispersion in productivity; (ii) diﬀerent workers are initially
selected by the COO to pick fruit, which has an ambiguous eﬀect on the dispersion in productivity.
The baseline result is that the introduction of performance bonuses increased the dispersion of
productivity on the field-day by 38% other things equal (Column 4). This result is robust to — (i)
controlling for the coeﬃcient of variation of experience of managers on the field-day; (ii) controlling
for other time varying variables such as meteorological conditions; (iii) alternative functional forms
that allow the controls to enter in levels, and allowing for a non-linear eﬀect of the field life cycle;
(iv) restricting the sample to workers who are exclusively assigned to picking tasks on a given day.
We note that in Column 4 the manager fixed eﬀects are jointly significant at the 1% significance
level suggesting that, as expected, the middle-tier of managers have significant eﬀects on the
dispersion of productivity. To provide more direct evidence that the behavior of managers changes
with the introduction of performance bonuses, we next include a set of interactions between each
manager’s fixed eﬀect and the performance bonus dummy and so estimate a specification analogous
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to (9). The interaction terms are positive and jointly significant. Weighting each interaction term
by the number of field-days manager s works under the performance bonus, we find the weighted
average eﬀect of managers’ fixed eﬀects on the log of workers’ coeﬃcient of variation of productivity
is .375, and is significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% significance level. This suggests managers
change behavior with the introduction of the performance bonus and this significantly increases
the dispersion of worker’s productivity.
These results have important implications for the inequality of earnings among workers. In
particular, the earnings inequality among workers significantly increases moving from a regime in
which their managers are paid fixed wages to when their managers are paid performance bonuses.
Figure 3 shows how the daily earnings inequality across workers — as measured by the interquartile
range of daily earnings — increases after the introduction of managerial performance bonuses.28

4.3

Further Evidence of a Causal Eﬀect of Managerial Incentives

The experimental design is such that the change in managerial incentives occurs simultaneously
for all managers in all fields. Hence identification of a causal eﬀect of this change on productivity
arises from a comparison within a field over time. The estimated eﬀect is then biased upward to
the extent that it captures factors that cause productivity to rise through the season regardless of
the change in incentive schemes and that are not captured by the observable time varying controls
such as the farm level trend, workers’ experience, or the field life cycle. We address this concern
using two diﬀerent strategies.
First, we augment the sample by adding field-day observations from the same farm in 2004
when managers were paid the same level of fixed wages throughout. This counterfactual allows us
to identify the causal eﬀect of managerial incentives on productivity under the assumption that
productivity would have been the same in 2003 and 2004, had managerial incentives remained
unchanged in 2003.
We construct the sample of field-days for the 2004 season in the same way as for the 2003
data. In particular, we restrict the 2004 sample to be based on fields that were operated at least a
week either side of June 27th — the date on which managerial incentives changed in 2003, and we
restrict the sample to be based on workers that were available for work at least three weeks either
side of June 27th. The final 2004 sample then contains 123 field-days, 55 of which occur before
28

Note also that there are some days when performance bonuses are in place where earnings inequality is lower
than when managers are paid fixed wages. This is due to the fact that, as discussed in Section 6, the most productive
workers pick much more frequently post-bonus. On days in which few pickers are needed only the most able workers
are present, which lowers earnings inequality among employed workers.
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June 27th. We stack the 2003 and 2004 field-day level data and estimate the following regression;
yf t = λf +

2
P

τ =1

ατ dτt +

2
P

τ =1

γ τ Pt dτt + ηZf t +

P

μs Ssf t + εf t ,

(11)

s∈Mf t

where yf t is the log of average productivity of workers on field f on day t, τ ∈ {1, 2} identifies
the season and d1t = 1 for the 2003 season and 0 otherwise, while d2t = 1 for the 2004 season and
0 otherwise. Pt = Bt for the 2003 season, and is a placebo for the 2004 season. Namely, Pt is
equal to one after June 27th 2004, that is when performance bonuses were introduced in 2003,
and zero otherwise. Thus γ 1 measures the eﬀect of managerial performance bonuses in 2003 on
average productivity and γ 2 measures the eﬀect of the placebo managerial performance bonus in
2004. As in the earlier specification we include field fixed eﬀects λf , and control for time varying
factors such as workers’ picking experience, the field life cycle, and a farm level time trend, in
Zf t .29 Permanent productivity diﬀerences across years are captured in the year fixed eﬀects ατ .
The results are presented in Table 6. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates in Column 1 indicate
that in 2003 the introduction of performance bonuses for managers significantly increases average
productivity. The magnitude of the eﬀect is similar to the baseline specification in Column 4 of
Table 4. In contrast, the placebo bonus dummy for the 2004 season has no eﬀect on productivity,
suggesting there is no natural increase in productivity on June 27th each year.
The second strategy exploits a feature of the performance bonus scheme that is orthogonal to
time and makes the incentives faced by managers stronger on some days and weaker on others.
The nominal productivity threshold, Y ∗ , is fixed at the start of the season and is the same across
all fields. Given that the fruit in fields deplete with time, the probability of exceeding the threshold
on a field declines later in its life cycle. Managerial incentives are therefore weaker later in the
field’s life cycle, all else equal. To explore this hypothesis we use the stacked 2003 and 2004 data
to estimate the following specification;
yf t = λf +

2
P

τ =1

ατ dτt +

2
P

τ =1

γ τ Pt dτt + ηLf t +

2
P

τ =1

π τ Pt dτt Lf t + ηZf0 t +

P

μs Ssf t + εf t ,

(12)

s∈Mf t

where Lf t is the field life cycle, Pt dτt Lf t is an interaction between the performance dummy the
field life cycle for season τ , and Zf0 t denotes the other time varying controls.
The result in Column 2 shows the marginal eﬀect of the performance bonus is significantly
lower when a field is later in its life cycle in the 2003 season. Importantly, in 2004 there is neither
29

While some of the fields observed in 2004 are the same as those in 2003 we allow the fixed eﬀect to be diﬀerent
to capture the fact that the plants are at a diﬀerent stage of their life in the two years. The same managers are not
present in both seasons. We restrict the coeﬃcients on the time varying variables to be the same across seasons.
Allowing these to also vary by year is equivalent to running each field-day regression by year. The results are
qualitatively unchanged in this case.
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a direct eﬀect of the placebo performance bonus on average productivity, nor does the eﬀect of
the placebo bonus vary with the field life cycle.
Figure 4 plots the implied marginal eﬀect of the bonus scheme on the log of average productivity,
by the field life cycle, from specification (12). The magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients imply
that if the performance bonus were introduced in a field at the start of its life cycle when the
performance bonus is most likely to be obtained, average workers’ productivity would increase by
close to 60%. By the end of the field life cycle, when the performance bonus is unlikely to be
obtained, the implied productivity is no diﬀerent to that when managers are paid fixed wages.30
We then repeat the analysis when the dependent variable is the coeﬃcient of variation of
workers’ productivity on the field-day, and the time varying controls are defined accordingly. The
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates in Column 3 show that in 2003 the introduction of performance
bonuses for managers significantly increases the coeﬃcient of variation of productivity. The magnitude of the eﬀect is slightly larger than in the baseline specification in Column 4 of Table 5.
The placebo bonus dummy for the 2004 season is significant and negative, which in line with the
descriptive evidence in Table 2, suggests the dispersion in productivity usually declines over time.
In Column 4 we see that the eﬀect of the performance bonus on the dispersion of productivity
does not vary with the life cycle in 2003. In contrast in 2004, the eﬀect of the placebo bonus
significantly falls with the field life cycle. One interpretation of this pattern of coeﬃcients is that
later in a field’s life cycle, there is less variation in the quantities of fruit across rows. When
managers are paid fixed wages, workers are allocated to rows independently of their ability. Hence
any dispersion in workers’ productivity reflects underlying heterogeneity in workers’ ability and
declines later in the field life cycle. In contrast when managers are paid performance bonuses they
have incentives to target their eﬀorts towards more able workers, and this oﬀsets the decline in
the dispersion of productivity across workers that would otherwise naturally occur.
We have so far defined the placebo bonus dummy Pt in terms of the date on which, in the
2003 season, the change in managerial incentives occurred. This date of June 27th corresponds
to the 44th day of the picking season in 2003. One concern is that there are natural changes in
productivity around the 44th day of picking, rather than around June 27th per se. This is of
concern because the picking season starts at a later date in 2004 than in 2003.
To address this concern we define an alternative placebo bonus dummy that is equal to one
after the 44th day of the 2004 season and zero otherwise. This placebo bonus dummy is therefore
defined in terms of the days of picking under the fixed wage regime rather than the date on which
managerial incentives were changed in 2003. Columns 5 to 8 repeat the earlier analysis using
30

The fact that productivity is no lower than under fixed wages by the end of the field life cycle suggests there are
no discouragement eﬀects of performance bonuses. This result also suggests there is no intertemporal substitution
of managerial eﬀort over time, from field-days when the threshold level of productivity is unattainable to field-days
when it is.
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this alternative definition of the placebo bonus dummy. For both the average and dispersion of
workers’ productivity, the results are very similar to those presented earlier.
Taken together, the results in Table 6 add weight to a causal interpretation of the eﬀect of
managerial performance bonuses on workers’ productivity. If the performance bonus dummy were
spuriously capturing other time varying factors, the eﬀect of the placebo bonus dummy should be
similar in the 2004 season, and the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence eﬀect of the bonus dummy should not
vary with the strength of managerial incentives as captured by the field life cycle.

5

Targeting Eﬀects

We now use individual level data to break down the aggregate eﬀects of managerial performance
bonuses into those arising through two separate channels — (i) a targeting eﬀect that stems from
managers having incentives to allocate their eﬀort across workers diﬀerently; (ii) a selection eﬀect
that stems from the COO selecting diﬀerent workers into the workplace. In this Section we provide
evidence on the targeting eﬀect. Section 6 investigates the selection eﬀect.
The targeting eﬀect is identified from a comparison of the same worker’s productivity under
both managerial incentive schemes. We therefore restrict attention to those workers that pick
when managers are paid a fixed wage and continue to be selected to pick under the managerial
performance regime. We first estimate a quantile regression to identify the heterogeneous eﬀects
of managerial performance bonuses across workers. We then estimate a fixed eﬀects regression
to identify the eﬀects of performance bonuses on the same worker and to shed light on which
observable worker characteristics explain the increased between worker variation in productivity
under managerial performance bonuses.

5.1

Quantile Regression Estimates

Theory suggests managers have greater incentives to target their eﬀort towards high ability workers
when they are paid performance bonuses tied to the average productivity of the workers they
manage, than when they are paid a fixed wage. Hence the eﬀect of managerial performance
bonuses on worker’s productivity will diﬀer at diﬀerent points of the distribution of workers’
productivity conditional on observables.
The quantile regression (QR) method developed in Koenker and Bassett (1978) provides a
general approach to characterizing the eﬀect of the performance bonus on diﬀerent percentiles
of the conditional distribution of worker productivity. The key advantages of this approach are
that it allows us to estimate changes in the shape and spread of the conditional distribution of
productivity, not just the change in the mean as estimated by OLS. In addition the QR method
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imposes no distributional assumptions on the error term, which in our context relates to the
unobservable distribution of ability.31
We use QR to estimate the following conditional distribution of the log of productivity of
worker i on field f on day t, yif t , at each quantile θ ∈ [0, 1];
Quant θ (yif t |.) = γ θ Bt + φθf λf + δ θ Xif t + η θ Zf t +

P

μθs Ssf t ,

(13)

s∈Mf t

where Bt is a dummy equal to one after the performance bonus is introduced, and zero otherwise,
λf is a dummy equal to one for field f , and zero otherwise, Xif t is the log of worker i’s picking
experience, and Zf t includes the log of the field life cycle, and a farm level time trend, and Ssf t is a
fixed eﬀect for manager s. The error terms are clustered by field-day because workers on the same
field-day face similar field conditions and hence are likely to be subject to common productivity
shocks. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1000 replications are calculated throughout.
The parameter of interest, γ θ , measures the eﬀect of the managerial performance bonus at
the θth conditional quantile of log worker productivity. Figure 5a graphs estimates of γ θ and
the associated 95% confidence interval at each quantile. This shows the heterogeneous eﬀects of
the performance bonus on worker productivity — the eﬀect is negative at the lowest conditional
quantiles, and positive and significant for those above the 60th conditional quantile. In line with
the descriptive evidence on the unconditional distribution of workers’ productivity in Figure 2a,
the QR estimates suggest the conditional distribution of productivity becomes more dispersed
under managerial performance bonuses.
Table 7 presents coeﬃcients and estimated standard errors at specific quantiles for the specification in (13). The pattern of coeﬃcients on the other controls are of note. While the returns
to picking experience are similar across quantiles, the eﬀect of the field life cycle varies across
quantiles. Although worker productivity declines in fields later in their life cycle, this eﬀect is
significantly smaller (in absolute value) for workers at higher quantiles of the conditional distribution of productivity. Consistent with the earlier evidence, if managerial eﬀort is targeted towards
high ability workers under performance bonuses, these workers will be less eﬀected by the natural
decline in productivity within a field over time.
One possible concern with this interpretation is that the conditional distribution of productivity
may naturally become more dispersed over time. For instance this may be because some pickers
quickly move up the learning curve and others become bored. The evidence from the control
season in 2004 however suggests the opposite. The descriptive evidence in Table 2 shows that in
2004 the dispersion of worker productivity is lower in the second half of the season. In addition,
31

The QR approach is particularly applicable to our context because the dependent variable, workers productivity,
is electronically recorded and measured with little or no error.
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estimating the quantile regression specification (13) in this control season, we find the eﬀect of
the placebo bonus dummy to be positive and significant for all quantiles below the 40th, zero for
intermediate quantiles, and negative and significant for the very highest quantiles. This finding
implies that in the absence of a change in managerial incentives, the conditional distribution of
productivity naturally becomes less dispersed over time.

5.2

Fixed Eﬀect Estimates

While the QR results provide evidence of the heterogenous eﬀects of managerial performance
bonuses on worker productivity, they do not pin down whether a given worker’s productivity
is systematically higher or lower when their manager is paid a performance bonus relative to
when she is paid a fixed wage. To provide such evidence on the eﬀects of managerial incentives
on the productivity of the same worker, we present fixed eﬀects estimates. We first estimate
the following worker-field-day specification for the 130 selected workers that pick under both
managerial incentive schemes;
yif t

130
X
P
=
(ρi + φi Bt )Di + λf + δXif t + ηZf t +
μs Ssf t + uif t ,

(14)

s∈Mf t

i=1

where yif t is the log of productivity of worker i on field f on day t, Di is a dummy equal to one
for worker i, and zero otherwise, and the other variables are as previously defined. We estimate
(14) using OLS, where disturbance terms are clustered by field-day because workers on the same
field-day are likely to face common productivity shocks.32
b
ρ³
of worker i’s expected productivity when her managers are paid a fixed wage,
i is an estimate
´
bi is her expected productivity when her managers are paid performance bonuses. To
and b
ρi + φ
re-scale these estimates ³in terms´ of kilograms per hour, Figure 5b then plots the exponent of b
ρi
bi for each selected worker. Each worker’s observation is weighted
against the exponent of b
ρi + φ
by the number of field-days that she is selected to pick under the performance bonus scheme.
The figure thus provides evidence on the eﬀect on the same worker of the change in a managerial
incentive scheme, conditional on observable determinants of productivity.
Figure 5b reiterates the message of the earlier descriptive evidence on unconditional worker
productivity by managerial incentive scheme (Figure 2b). In particular we see that conditional on
observable determinants of worker productivity — (i) there are heterogeneous eﬀects of managerial
incentives across workers — some workers have systematically higher productivity with the change
in managerial incentives, others have systematically lower productivity; (ii) the more productive
32

Clustering at the worker or worker-managerial incentive scheme level yields considerably smaller standard
errors. The fixed eﬀects alone explain around 38% of the variation in productivity, suggesting there is considerable
heterogeneity in the underlying ability of workers.
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workers under the fixed wage regime always have higher productivity under the performance bonus
scheme; (iii) those workers that experience an increase in their productivity are selected to pick
most frequently under the performance bonus.33
These heterogeneous eﬀects are also partly explained by the fall in the piece rate that follows
from the rise in average productivity. More precisely, productivity falls for some workers because
— (i) less managerial eﬀort is targeted towards them so for example, they are allocated worse
quality rows; (ii) the piece rate has fallen and they would prefer to exert less eﬀort all else equal.
In contrast, the productivity of others workers increases because managerial eﬀort is targeted
towards them and despite the fact that the piece rate has fallen. These results highlight that the
increase in earnings inequality documented earlier, even among selected workers, arises because
some of them significantly increase their productivity under managerial performance bonuses while
others experience a significant decrease in their productivity.
Further analysis shows that the heterogeneous productivity responses across workers are partially explained by observed workers characteristics. We find that the introduction of managerial
incentives increases the productivity of workers who — (i) are men; (ii) report playing sports; (iii)
report monetary earnings as one of the main reasons for coming to the farm.34 These factors
may reasonably proxy physical strength, motivation or ability. The estimates imply a worker with
all these characteristics has 18% higher productivity under the performance bonus compared to
himself pre-bonus. A worker with none of these characteristics has 11% lower productivity under
the bonus compared to herself pre-bonus.

6
6.1

Selection Eﬀects
Descriptive Evidence

Theory predicts that changing the COO’s compensation scheme from fixed wages to suﬃciently
high powered performance pay will make him change his selection strategy in favor of the most
able workers as this increases average productivity. The descriptive evidence in Table 2 and the
estimated eﬀects on the productivity of individual workers in Figure 5b are both indicative of
selection eﬀects as they highlight that some workers are fired while more productive workers are
33

Using b
ρi as a measure of a worker’s ability, we find that groups of workers on the field-day were equally
heterogeneous before and after the change in managerial incentives. Hence there is no evidence the COO sorts
workers diﬀerently by ability into fields post-bonus. This is as expected given the considerable variation in the
quantity of fruit available across rows within a field.
34
This information was obtained from a survey we administered to workers and managers before the performance
bonus was introduced. The ‘play sports’ dummy is defined to be one if the worker reports playing sports at least
once a month, and zero otherwise. The ‘came for earnings’ dummy is defined to be one if the worker reports one
reason why they came to the farm is because the pay is good, and zero otherwise. Other options were ‘to travel
and meet new people’, ‘to learn English’, and ‘it is part of my university course’.
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selected to pick more often after the change in managerial pay. This section presents evidence on
the selection mechanism and sheds light on the relative importance of the selection and targeting
eﬀects of managerial incentives on the rise in average productivity.
To analyze the selection choices of the COO, we now consider the sample of all workers that
are available to pick fruit. This is the relevant pool of workers over which the COO makes his
selection decision.35 Each day the COO selects which workers pick fruit, which workers perform
other tasks such as weeding or planting, and which workers are unemployed for the day. As the
introduction of the managerial bonus scheme increases workers’ productivity, fewer workers are
needed to pick the same quantity of fruit. Indeed as shown earlier in Tables 2 and 3, 67 workers are
fired from picking tasks and the average number of workers on a field-day is 29% lower after the
introduction of managerial incentives. For the average worker, the probability of being assigned
to a picking task on any given day falls from 44% to 25%.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the number of field-days workers are selected to pick fruit by
managerial incentive scheme, conditional on being chosen at least once under both schemes. The
histograms highlight that even among those workers that still pick at least once under performance
bonuses, there is a wide dispersion in the number of field-days workers are selected to pick fruit
post-bonus. We divide selected workers into two groups — we define selected-in workers as those in
the top quartile of the distribution of number of field-days picked post-bonus. On average, workers
in this group pick on 100 field-days after the introduction of the bonus. Selected-out workers are
defined to be those workers in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of number of fielddays picked post-bonus. The average worker in this category picks on 18 field-days post bonus.
Moreover, a further 67 out of the 197 workers in our sample are fired, namely they are never
selected to pick after the introduction of the bonus scheme.
Table 8 shows that, as expected, whether a worker falls in the selected-in, selected-out or fired
category is correlated to her productivity before the introduction of managerial incentives. Panel A
shows there is a clear ranking in terms of productivity across diﬀerent groups of workers — those who
were most productive when managers were paid fixed wages are selected to pick more frequently
when managers are paid performance bonuses. Workers with intermediate productivity levels
are only selected to pick occasionally post-bonus, and those workers with the lowest productivity
pre-bonus are fired from picking tasks altogether.
Panel B of Table 8 shows unemployment rates by worker type and managerial incentive scheme.
Under fixed wages, there is a clear ranking of unemployment rates across the three types of
worker. When performance bonuses are introduced, unemployment rates rise for all workers, but
the increase is higher for workers who are fired and those who are selected out, indicating that
35

Recall that to present evidence on the targeting eﬀect, we previously considered those workers that were
available for picking three weeks either side of the change in managerial incentive schemes.
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these workers are not simply reallocated to other non-picking tasks. In contrast, no workers are
fired in the 2004 picking season. This is as expected given there is no rise in productivity over the
two halves of the season in 2004.
An important consequence of these changes in the selection of workers into work and unemployment is that the diﬀerential rise in unemployment increases the earnings inequality across workers
over the season. This selection eﬀect exacerbates the increase in earnings inequality documented
earlier, that arises because the eﬀects of managerial incentives on individual worker productivity
are very heterogeneous to begin with.

6.2

Conditional Logit Estimates

We shed light on the eﬀect of managerial performance pay on the selection of workers into employment while controlling for farm level variables that aﬀect the probability of being hired independently of the incentive scheme in place. Importantly, we are able to disentangle the eﬀect of
managerial performance pay from changes in the supply and the demand of labor. We measure
labor supply using personnel records on the number of workers available for hire on the farm on
any given day. We measure the demand for labor using the total daily fruit yield on each site on
the farm. The total yield is orthogonal to the incentive scheme as it is determined by planting
decisions taken one or two years earlier. Fields are located on two sites, of which we use the
largest for the analysis as fruit in the smaller site begins to ripen only after the introduction of
the performance bonus scheme. Since both sites hire workers from the same pool, we control for
yields in each site separately.
We estimate the following conditional logit model, where observations are grouped by worker;
Pr(pit = 1) = Λ(Bt , XtD , XtS , Xit ).

(15)

pit equals one if worker i is selected by the COO to pick on day t on the main site, and is zero
otherwise. XtD and XtS proxy the demand and supply of labor on day t. All continuous variables
are divided by their standard deviations so that one unit increase can be interpreted as an increase
of one standard deviation. We report odds ratios throughout, and standard errors are calculated
using the delta method.
Column 1 of Table 9 shows that, other things equal, workers are significantly less likely to
be selected into the workforce after the introduction of the performance bonus — the odds ratio
post-bonus is 77% of the ratio pre-bonus. The other coeﬃcients show that, as expected, workers
are more likely to work on days in which the fields on the main site bears more fruit and on days
in which they face less competition from other workers. The estimates imply that a one standard
deviation increase in yield more than doubles the odds of being selected, whereas one standard
30

deviation increase in the stock of available workers reduces the odds of working to less than a half.
Conditional on not being selected to pick on the main site on a given day, a worker can either
be assigned to other tasks on the main site, to work on the other site, or be left unemployed
for the day. Column 3 shows that the introduction of the bonus scheme significantly raises the
probability of being unemployed. In particular, when the bonus scheme is in place the odds
of being unemployed on any given day rise by a quarter. Reasonably, the probability of being
unemployed is lower when yields are higher and when the stock of available workers is lower.
The results in Table 9 show that conditional on time varying factors, the average worker is less
likely to be selected into picking and more likely to be left unemployed following the introduction
of the managerial bonus scheme. Section 5 showed that, conditional on being selected to pick, the
productivity of some workers raises while the productivity of others falls after the introduction of
the managerial bonus scheme. Next, we analyze whether these two eﬀects reinforce each other,
namely whether workers who experience the largest increase in productivity are also more likely
to be selected into picking.
To do so we use a linear probability model and estimate the following specification;
130
X
(ψi + ω i Bt )Di + δXtD + ηXtS + uit ,
pit =

(16)

i=1

where pit , XtD and XtS are as defined before, and Di is a dummy equal to one for worker i, and zero
b i is an estimate of worker i’s probability to be selected to pick when her managers
otherwise.36 ψ
´
³
b
b i is her probability to be selected when her managers are paid
are paid a fixed wage, and ψi + ω
performance bonuses.
Figure 7a then plots ω
b i — the change in probability of worker i to be selected into picking with
bi from the fixed eﬀects regression
the introduction of performance bonuses for managers, against φ
of worker’s productivity (14) — worker i’s change in log productivity when performance bonuses
are introduced. The line of best fit slopes upward, indicating that workers who experience the
largest increase in productivity also have the greatest increase in the likelihood to be selected into
employment, conditional on all other determinants of productivity and selection.
To assess whether workers who are less likely to be selected into picking are reallocated to other
tasks or left unemployed, Figure 7b presents evidence on the relationship between the change in
the probability of being unemployment and the change in the probability of being selected into
picking. We estimate a linear probability model analogous to (16) where pit is redefined to be
equal to one if worker i is unemployed on day t, and zero if worker i is assigned to a non-picking
task. Figure 7b plots the change in the probability of worker i being unemployed against the
36

The mean of the dependent variable is close to one half and so the LPM does not predict any probabilities
outside the [0,1] interval.
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change in the probability of worker i being selected into picking, moving from fixed wages to
managerial performance bonuses. The relationship is negative, suggesting workers who are less
likely to be selected to pick after the introduction of the bonus scheme are also more likely to be
left unemployed.
Figures 7a and 7b indicate that the introduction of managerial performance bonuses has heterogenous eﬀects on diﬀerent workers’ probability to be selected into picking and on their probability of being left unemployed. The analysis also illustrates that the targeting and selection
eﬀects reinforce each other. Workers who experience a greater increases in their productivity also
experience the greatest increase in the likelihood of being selected to pick fruit, and the greatest
decrease in the likelihood of being left unemployed for the day.

6.3

The Relative Importance of the Targeting and Selection Eﬀects

In our setting, the introduction of managerial performance pay increases productivity both because
the productivity of the most able workers increases and because the most able workers contribute
to the average more often. These two eﬀects reinforce each other, as the workers who experience
the highest rise in productivity are also more likely to be selected in.37
To understand the relative importance of the selection and targeting eﬀects on average productivity, we conduct two thought experiments. In each case we compute the increase in productivity
had the selection process remained unchanged over the season. Namely, the increase in productivity had each worker been chosen with the same probability after the bonus as she was before the
bonus. In both cases we assume the productivity of selected-in and selected-out workers would be
the same as actually observed, as given in Table 8.38
For the first thought experiment we assume the productivity of fired workers would have
remained unchanged after the introduction of the bonus scheme. Under this assumption, average
productivity would have increased by 7.5% in the post-bonus period.
For the second thought experiment we assume the productivity of all fired workers would have
increased in the same proportion as the average of the selected-in workers. Under this assumption,
average productivity would have increased by 11.1% in the post-bonus period.
Given the unconditional increase in productivity is 25%, these thought experiments suggest
that the observed increase in productivity is driven at least as much by the selection of more
37

There are too few managers in the data to say anything meaningful on the possible selection by the COO of
‘better’ managers post-bonus. Although fewer managers are needed on each field-day under the performance bonus
(Table 3), managers continue to work each day. They are typically reassigned to fields either on the smaller site,
or onto fields in the main site that are only operated post-bonus.
38
We implicitly assume that there are no peer eﬀects, namely the eﬀect of the bonus would be the same regardless
of the composition of the workforce, and that the eﬀect of the bonus on each individual worker does not depend
on how frequently they pick — namely that the best pickers would experience the same increase even if they were
to pick less frequently post bonus.
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productive workers — that is largely attributable to the behavior of the COO, as it is driven by
increases in the productivity of the same workers — something that is largely attributable to the
behavior of managers. This is consistent with a ‘magnification eﬀect’ (Rosen 1982), so that the
actions of individuals higher up in the firm hierarchy have a greater impact on firm performance
than do the actions of individuals at lower tiers of the hierarchy.39
We perform similar thought experiments to assess the relative importance of targeting and
selection eﬀects in explaining the observed change in the dispersion of workers’ productivity.
These reveal that the change in dispersion is nearly entirely due to the fact that managers target
the most able workers after the introduction of performance pay. In other words, the coeﬃcient of
variation would have increased by the same amount had the selection remained unchanged. The
reason is that, as shown in Table 8, the productivity of the marginal worker who is still employed
after the bonus is more similar to the fired workers than to the most able workers. Namely, the
distribution of ability across workers is such that even when the least able workers are fired, the
marginal worker selected to pick is still of relatively low ability and so there remains considerable
heterogeneity in productivity across selected workers.

6.4

Potentially Reinforcing Mechanisms

We have so far emphasized that the change in managerial incentives aﬀects worker productivity
through both a targeting and selection eﬀect, and provided evidence on the relative importance
of both. In our setting there are however two additional mechanisms through which the eﬀects on
productivity may be reinforced.
The first possibility is that some of the rise in productivity can be attributed to the fact
that tighter selection creates a rat race or rank order tournament among workers (Akerlof 1976,
Lazear and Rosen 1981). Indeed, by exerting eﬀort workers not only increase their earnings today
because they are paid a piece rate, but also increase the probability of being retained for future
employment. In our setting, however, the most able workers experience an increase in productivity
whereas the least able do not. This pattern would be consistent with a rat-race only if it were too
costly for the low ability workers to engage in the rat-race so that only the high ability workers
would be motivated by it. This seems unlikely in light of the fact that the marginal worker selected
into employment has low ability, which implies that the high ability workers are unlikely to be left
unemployed. In general, any rat race eﬀect would reinforce the large and heterogeneous eﬀects
that managerial eﬀort has on workers. Disentangling the eﬀects of managerial eﬀort from those of
39

The theoretical literature has traditionally focused on determining the optimal number of layers in a hierarchy,
the span of control at each layer, and the distribution of wages within the firm (Williamson 1967, Calvo and Wellisz
1978, Qian 1994). We have taken the first two factors as given throughout — workers are always managed in the
firm we study, and as detailed in Section 3, managers’ span of control remains constant throughout the season.
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a rat race would at least require more precise information on managerial actions on each field-day,
such as the allocation of workers to rows, which is unavailable.
Peer eﬀects are a second mechanism through which the increase in average productivity could
be reinforced. We have shown that following the introduction of managerial performance pay,
the lowest ability workers are fired and this may aﬀect the productivity of the remaining selected
workers. In particular, if workers work harder when they are surrounded by more productive
colleagues, firing the least able workers might increase the productivity of the remaining workers.
In our context, however, the fact that the most able workers experience the highest increase in
productivity while the least able selected workers are not aﬀected (Figure 5a) suggest there would
have to be a very particular pattern of peer eﬀects for this hypothesis to explain the data. Namely,
peer eﬀects should be such that the individuals who are most dissimilar to the fired workers are
aﬀected the most while the individuals who are most similar are aﬀected the least. In other words,
the highest ability workers should be most aﬀected by the removal of the least able workers, while
the lowest ability workers still selected in, should be unaﬀected by the removal of similarly low
ability workers.

7

Discussion

This paper presents evidence from a firm level experiment designed to identify the eﬀects of managerial performance pay on the mean and the dispersion of productivity of lower tier workers. We
find that the introduction of managerial performance pay raises both the mean and the dispersion
of productivity. The analysis of individual productivity data from personnel records, shows that
the results are due to two underlying changes in managerial behavior.
First, there is a targeting eﬀect of managerial incentives. Managers allocate relatively more of
their eﬀort towards high ability workers, so that the most able worker experience the highest rise
in productivity. Second, there is a selection eﬀect of managerial incentives — the least able workers
are employed less often and in some cases fired. In line with theoretical predictions, both eﬀects
increase average productivity.
Theoretically, these two forces may however have oﬀsetting eﬀects on the dispersion of productivity depending on the strength of complementarity between manager and workers’ eﬀorts,
and the underlying distribution of workers’ ability. The evidence suggests the targeting eﬀect is
relatively more important in explaining the increase in dispersion of productivity. This is because
although the least productive workers are fired after the introduction of performance pay, the
demand for labor remains suﬃciently high so that the productivity diﬀerential between the most
able workers and the marginal workers hired remains large.
The first order gain to the firm is the 21% increase in average productivity. Since average
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worker productivity increased, fewer workers were required to pick the same quantity of fruit.
This reduction in the firm’s wage bill is orders of magnitude larger than the monetary costs of
paying the performance bonuses and administering the scheme. The introduction of managerial
incentives thus considerably increased profits for the firm.
The purely exogenous variation in managerial incentives created by our natural field experiment
in combination with detailed personnel records and a fixed pool of individuals in the workforce
allows us to precisely identify the causal eﬀect of high powered managerial incentives on the
firm’s productivity through both targeting and selection of lower tier workers. Precision, however,
inevitably entails some loss of generality, because the firm we study, as any other, has unique
features that drive the eﬀect of managerial incentives on productivity.
Two features of our firm are particularly relevant for the external validity of this study. First,
the employment situation is rather special as the pool of managers and workers available for
employment is fixed and observable, at least in the short run. While this allows us to analyze
the eﬀect of changing incentives for the same managers and to present detailed evidence on how
managerial incentives aﬀect the selection of workers into employment, it is unlikely to apply to
most settings in the long run. In a more general setting, a number of other factors would need to
be taken into account.
Notably, when new workers and managers can join the firm, we expect high powered managerial
incentives to attract more able managers and COO to the firm (Lazear 2005). In addition, if the
COO can hire from a larger pool of workers, he might want to attract more productive workers
when he is paid a performance bonus. To the extent that more productive workers have a higher
outside option, however, the COO might need to increase workers’ pay to attract them. Thus,
in contrast to what happens in our setting, it might be optimal to make the workers’ incentives
more high powered, for example by increasing the piece rate. This is in line, for instance, with
the analysis of Groves et al (1994) who find that the introduction of high powered incentives
for managers in Chinese firms is correlated with the introduction of high powered incentives for
bottom-tier workers.
Overall, when the pool of managers and the pool of individuals available for employment is
not fixed the introduction of high powered managerial incentives might attract more productive
workers and managers to the firm, thus reinforcing the productivity enhancing eﬀect we find here.
However, this might come at the cost of a higher wage bill.
Second, in our setting workers operate independently of one another and the manager can
target their eﬀort to individual workers. While this is true in many other settings, such as for
salespeople, it is not the case in all settings. When workers operate in teams or, more generally,
when managerial eﬀort targeted to one worker has spillovers on others, the incentives for managers
to target workers would be diﬀerent. Hence the eﬀect of targeting on both the average and
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dispersion of productivity would be diﬀerent.
While our experimental research design is tailored to provide credible evidence on the eﬀects
of managerial incentives in this particular context, our results have broad implications for understanding behavior within firms more generally.40
Our findings shed some light on why firms provide performance related pay to managers in
the first place. While such incentive schemes are obviously designed to increase unobservable
managerial eﬀort, our results also suggest another more subtle reason for their use. This stems
from the general observation that firms are typically constrained to oﬀer bottom-tier workers
the same compensation scheme. This may be because of legal, technological or informational
constraints (Lazear 1989, Bewley 1999, Encinosa et al 1997, Fehr et al 2004).
To the extent that bottom-tier workers are of heterogeneous ability, however, oﬀering the same
compensation scheme to all of them will, in general, not be optimal for the firm. When managers’
pay is linked to firm’s performance, their interests become more aligned with those of the firm
and they have greater incentives to target their eﬀort to specific workers in order to oﬀset the
ineﬃciency that arises because of the common compensation scheme. From the worker’s point of
view it is then as if they face an individual specific incentive scheme.
This opens a broad empirical research agenda to examine whether firms are indeed more likely
to oﬀer managers performance pay in settings where lower tier workers are of heterogeneous ability,
managers are able to target their eﬀort towards specific workers, and workers are oﬀered the same
compensation scheme.
Our findings also highlight the interplay between the provision of managerial incentives and the
earnings inequality among lower-tier workers. Such a linkage exists whenever managers can target
their eﬀorts towards some workers and away from others, and managers choose which individuals
are selected into the workforce. Understanding whether and how managerial incentives determine
earnings inequality among workers is important for two reasons.
First, to the extent that managers do not internalize the eﬀect of their actions on the long
run performance of the firm, exacerbating inequality due to natural ability diﬀerences may be
40

The analysis also has wider implications for environments outside of the workplace. For example, the provision
of teacher incentives based on the average performance of students may have important consequences for the
distribution of test scores among students, and the composition of students, and possibly teachers, admitted
into schools. Existing evidence indicate that school accountability programs, whereby schools are rewarded or
sanctioned based on average test scores or on the pass rate generate both selection and targeting eﬀects, as weaker
students are prevented to sit the test and teachers target resources to the marginal students at the expense of
the others. For instance, Burgess et al (2005) find that the introduction of school accountability based on test
pass rates improved the performance of students in the middle of the ability distribution, at the expense of both
high achieving and low achieving students. Similarly, Hanushek and Raymond (2004) and Reback (2005) provide
evidence on the distributional consequences on student achievement under the No Child Left Behind policy. Finally,
Jacob (2002) and Figlio and Getzer (2002) provide evidence on the selection eﬀect. They show that the introduction
of accountability schemes lead to an increase in grade retention and special educational placement in Chicago and
Florida public schools, respectively.
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detrimental to the firms’ long run performance. This is because increased perceptions of unfair
treatment among workers might lead to less cooperation in the workplace (Baron and Pfeﬀer 1994,
Bewley 1999, Lazear 1989). The possibility that firms trade-oﬀ the benefits of incentive pay with
these types of long run eﬀects when designing compensation schemes for their employees deserves
further research.
Second, the interplay between managerial incentives and earnings inequality among workers
highlights a possible link between two important trends in labor markets over the past twenty years
that have previously been unconnected in the economics literature — the rising use of managerial
performance pay, and the rising earnings inequality among observationally similar workers.41

8
8.1

Appendices
Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1: We first show that if the manager chooses m = 1 and workers are suﬃciently
heterogeneous in ability, the unique equilibrium is the one in which the manager targets the more
able worker only. This part of the proof proceeds in two steps. First we show that if θi < θj , then
mi = 1, mj = 0 is an equilibrium. We then show that if (θj − θi ) is large enough the equilibrium
is unique.
(i) For mi = 1, mj = 0 to be an equilibrium we need to show that given mi = 1, mj = 0, the
workers’ optimal response implies ei > ej and that given ei > ej the manager’s optimal response
implies mi = 1, mj = 0 . For the first part, note that when mi = 1 and mj = 0, the workers’
, êj = θβj , and hence êi > êj since θi < θj and k > 0. For the second
optimal response is êi = β(1+k)
θi
part note that if ei > ej , the manager’s payoﬀ w + 12 b[(1 + kmi )ei + (1 + kmj )ej ] − cm is maximized
when mi = 1 and mj = 0.
(ii) Since the manager’s payoﬀ is a linear combination of the two workers’ eﬀort levels, the
solution must lie at a corner. For mi = 1, mj = 0 to be the unique equilibrium, we then need
to rule out the other corner solution, namely mi = 0, mj = 1. A necessary condition for mi = 0,
mj = 1 to be an equilibrium is that the workers’ optimal response yields ei < ej . When mi = 0,
. It follows that if (θj − θi ) > kθβ i , ei > ej and mi = 0, mj = 1
mj = 1, ei = θβi and ej = β(1+k)
θj
cannot be an equilibrium.
We now prove the first part of the Lemma. Using the equilibrium levels of the manager and
workers’ eﬀort we see that if the manager exerts low eﬀort, her payoﬀ is w + 12 b[ θβi + θβj ]. If she
41

Residual or within-group wage inequality, namely, the wage dispersion among workers with the same education
and experience, accounts for most of the growth in overall wage inequality in the US. This has been argued to have
increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Juhn et el 1993), and into the 1990s (Acemoglu 2002, and Autor et al
2005).
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2

chooses high eﬀort her payoﬀ is w + 12 b[ β(1+k)
+ θβj ] − c. The manager chooses high eﬀort if and
θi
only if the payoﬀ from doing so is larger, namely if and only if;
∙

β(1 + k)2 − β
b ≥ b̄ = 2c
θi

¸−1

.

(17)

Intuitively, the threshold increases in the marginal cost of eﬀort c, and decreases if the marginal
benefit of managerial eﬀort is higher. The marginal benefit is positively related to worker i’s
ability, θi , to the piece rate, β, and to the strength of the complementarity between the manager’s
and the workers’ eﬀort, k.¥
Proof of Proposition 1: Using Lemma 1 and the workers’ best response functions we can
straightforwardly compute the average productivity and the dispersion of productivity when the
manager is paid fixed wages and when she is given suﬃciently high powered incentives. Average
productivity is;
β(θi +θj )
2θi θj
β((1+k)2 θj +θi )
2θi θj
β((1+k)2 θ +θ )

j
i
>
and
θi θj
of productivity, is;

β(θi +θj )
θi θ j

if b ≥ b̄

(18)

since k > 0. The dispersion of productivity, as measured by the range

β(θj −θi )
θi θj
β((1+k)2 θj −θi )
θi θj
β((1+k)2 θ −θ )

if b = 0

if b = 0
if b ≥ b̄

(19)

β(θ −θ )

j
i
> θii θj j as k > 0. The dispersion in productivity is increasing in the strength
and
θ i θj
of the complementarity between manager’s and worker’s eﬀort.¥
Proof of Lemma 2: Given the COO’s discrete eﬀort choice, we characterize the solution
to his maximization problem by comparing his payoﬀ when s = 1 to ³when s = 0.´ When s = 1
2 (ê2 )
− C. When
the COO never selects worker 3, and his expected payoﬀ is W + B y1 (ê1 )+y
2
s ³
= 0 the COO selects
each worker with equal probability, and his expected payoﬀ is W +
´
y1 (ê1 )+y2 (ê2 )+y3 (ê3 )
. Using the worker’s equilibrium choice of eﬀort (5), the diﬀerence in these
B
3
³³
´ ³
´´
β
1
1
1
1
payoﬀs is B 6
− θ3 + θ2 − θ3
− C, where the first term is positive as θ1 < θ2 < θ3 .The
θ1
COO chooses s = 1 if and only if the diﬀerence in payoﬀs is non-negative, namely if and only if;

¶ µ
¶¶¸−1
∙ µµ
1
1
1
1
β
+
−
−
.
B ≥ B̄ = C
6
θ1 θ3
θ2 θ3

(20)

Intuitively, the threshold is higher if the marginal cost of eﬀort is higher, and lower if the marginal
benefit is higher. The latter is higher when the workers’ piece rate is higher and when the benefit
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of cream-skimming is higher, namely when worker 3’s ability level is very low (θ3 very high).¥
Proof of Proposition 2: When 0 ≤ B < B̄ all workers are selected with equal probability and expected average productivity is 13 (y1 (ê1 ) + y2 (ê2 ) + y3 (ê3 )). When B ≥ B̄ the
COO chooses the most able two workers and average productivity is 12 (y1 (ê1 ) + y2 (ê2 )). Using
the
eﬀort levels from (5) the diﬀerence in expected average productivity is
³³workers’´equilibrium
³
´´
β
1
1
1
1
− θ3 + θ2 − θ3
which is positive as θ1 < θ2 < θ3 . This proves the first part of the
6
θ1
Proposition.
When
³ 0 ≤ ´B < B̄ all workers are selected with equal probability and the expected dispersion
is 23 β θ11 − θ13 . When B ≥ B̄ the COO chooses the most able two workers and dispersion
´
³
´
³
is β θ11 − θ12 . High powered incentives therefore reduce dispersion if and only if θ11 − θ12 <
³
´
2
1
1
. This requires the ability level of worker 3 be suﬃciently low or the ability level of
−
3 θ1
θ3
workers 1 and 2 to be suﬃciently similar. Intuitively, the diﬀerence in dispersion derives from the
fact that when B ≥ B̄ worker 3 is never selected and workers 1 and 2 always work together. If
their ability diﬀerence is suﬃciently low relative to the ability of worker 3, dispersion falls.¥
Proof of Proposition 3: The eﬀect on average productivity follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 2. The eﬀect on dispersion can be computed as follows. When b = B = 0, both the
COO and the manager choose low eﬀort in equilibrium, so ŝ = 0 and m̂ = 0. From (5) we see that
ên = θβn for n = 1, 2, and 3. As the COO selects each worker with equal probability each worker
´
³
pair is selected with probability 1/3, and expected dispersion is equal to 23 β θ11 − θ13 . When
b ≥ b̄ and B ≥ B̄, both the COO and the manager choose high eﬀort in equilibrium, so ŝ = 1 and
m̂ = 1. The COO selects
1 ´and 2 and the manager targets the most able worker, worker
³ workers
(1+k)2
− θ12 . The diﬀerence in dispersion with the fixed wage scheme is
1. Thus dispersion is β
θ1
h³
´
³
´i
2
1
1
2
1
1
β 2k+k
+
−
−
−
. The first term is the manager’s targeting eﬀect and is always
θ1
θ1
θ2
3 θ1
θ3
positive. The second term is the COO’s selection eﬀect which is negative if, as discussed above,
the ability level of worker 3 be suﬃciently low or the ability level of workers 1 and 2 suﬃciently
similar. The targeting eﬀect is stronger, and hence more likely to dominate and increase dispersion
when the complementarity between the manager’s and worker’s eﬀort, k, is higher.¥

8.2

Predicting the Piece Rate

As discussed in Section 2.1, the firm aims to minimize its wage bill subject to a minimum wage
constraint. In particular, the COO is instructed to set the piece rate each field-day so that all
workers obtain an hourly wage of at least w, where w is above the legally prescribed minimum
wage and is set by the owner at the beginning of the season. Hence in practical terms, the piece
rate falls whenever productivity is higher.
In this subsection we explore whether this rule is followed throughout the season, or whether
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the COO sets the piece rate higher than is in the firms interests, thereby providing additional
incentives to workers and increasing the likelihood he obtains the performance bonus. We estimate
the following regression to understand the determinants of the piece rate;
β f t = λf + ηZf t + μRt +

P

μs Ssf t + εf t ,

(21)

s∈Mf t

where β f t is the piece rate on field-day ft, λf are field fixed eﬀects, Zf t are time varying characteristics of the workers and field, Rt are meteorological conditions, and Ssf t is a dummy for whether
manager s is present on field-day ft. The error terms are assumed to follow a field-specific AR(1)
process.42
We first estimate (21) using the sample of pre-bonus field-days, and use this to predict the
piece rate in the post-bonus period. Figure A1 shows this out-of-sample prediction, and Appendix
Table A1 Column 1 shows the regression coeﬃcients from (21). As expected, the piece rate is
consistently over predicted in the post-bonus period when the prediction is derived from the fielddays pre-bonus. Moreover, the result in Table A1 shows that factors that are positively correlated
to productivity are negatively correlated to the piece rate. If we then additionally control for the
performance bonus dummy in (21), Figure A1 shows the actual piece rate is predicted with little
systematic error.43 The information in both the level and the trend in these residuals suggests
that the COO continues to set the piece rate using the same algorithm throughout the season.
This is as expected given that — (i) the COO is a permanent employee of the firm; (ii) the wage
bill is easily observable by the COO’s own manager, the owner of the firm.
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Figure 2a: Kernel Density Estimates of Worker Productivity
by Managerial Incentive Scheme
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Figure 2b: Scatter Plot of Worker Productivity
by Managerial Incentive Scheme
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Notes: Both figures use data on workers that are selected to pick fruit at least once under each managerial
compensation schemes. The density estimates in Figure 2a are calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel. In Figure 2b,
each observation is weighted by the number of field-days the worker picks under the managerial bonus scheme. A larger
circle indicates that the worker picks on more field-days under the managerial performance bonus regime.

Figure 3: Pay Inequality Among Workers, by Managerial Incentive Scheme
Interquartile Range of Daily Pay

(mean) iqrpaydo

Interquartile range of daily pay (£)

40

Introduction of performance
bonus for managers

30

20

10

0
1st May
01may2003

1st June
01jun2003

1st July
01jul2003
Date (DD MMM 03)

1st August
01aug2003

1st September
01sep2003

Estimated effect on the log of productivity
(kg/hr), field-day level

Figure 4: Estimated Effect of the Change in Managerial Incentives on
Productivity, by Field Life Cycle
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Notes: In Figure 3, the interquartile range is first calculated for each field-day. The daily average is computed by
weighting each field-day by the total man-hours worked on it. Figure 4 graphs the estimated effect of the managerial
performance bonus on average worker productivity, at different stages of the field life cycle. The figure also shows the
corresponding 95% confidence interval. The field life cycle is defined as the n th day the field is picked divided by the
total number of days the field is picked over the season.
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Figure 5a: Quantile Regression Estimates
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Figure 5b: Workers' Fixed Effects
Workers fixed effect when managers are
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Notes: Figure 5a graphs the estimated effect of the managerial performance bonus dummy on the log of worker
productivity at each quantile of the conditional distribution of the log of worker productivity, and the associated 95%
confidence interval. Bootstrapped standard errors that are clustered by field-day are estimated, based on 1000
replications. Figure 5b is based on a worker-field-day fixed effects regression. It plots the exponent of the workers fixed
effect when managers are in the fixed wage regime against the exponent of their fixed effect when managers are in the
performance bonus regime. Each observation is weighted by the number of field-days the worker picks under the
managerial bonus scheme. A larger circle indicates that the worker picks on more field-days under the managerial
performance bonus regime.

Figure 6: Distribution of Field-days Selected to Pick Fruit Across
Workers, by Managerial Incentive Scheme
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Notes: These histograms are drawn for those workers that are selected to pick fruit at least on one field-day under
each managerial incentive scheme. Hence they do not include "fired" workers that would otherwise be massed at zero
on the lower histogram.
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Figure 7a: Selection and Productivity
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Figure 7b: Unemployment and Selection
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Notes: To estimate the effect of the performance bonus on individual worker productivity, we regress log productivity on worker's picking experience,
the field life cycle, a time trend and workers' fixed effects interacted with the bonus dummy. The effect of managerial bonuses on workers' productivity
for any given worker is computed as the difference between the worker's fixed effect when managers are paid bonuses and the worker's fixed effect
when managers are paid fixed wages. To estimate the effect of the performance bonus on the probability of being selected to pick fruit, we first define a
selection dummy which is equal to one on days in which the worker is selected to pick, and zero otherwise. We then regress this selection dummy on
labor supply, labor demand and workers' fixed effects interacted with the bonus dummy. The effect of managerial bonuses on workers' probability of
being selected for any given worker is computed as the difference between the worker's fixed effect when managers are paid bonuses and the worker's
fixed effect when managers are paid fixed wages. To estimate the effect of the performance bonus on the probability of being unemployed, we first
define an unemployment dummy which is equal to one on days in which the worker is unemployed, and zero if she is assigned to non-picking tasks.
We then regress the unemployment dummy on labor supply, labor demand and workers' dummies interacted with the bonus dummy. The effect of
managerial bonuses on unemployment for any given worker is computed as the difference between the worker's fixed effect when managers are paid
bonuses and the worker's fixed effect when managers are paid fixed wages.
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Notes: The dashed series labeled 'Without bonus dummy' is based on the specification in Column 1 of Table A1. This
uses the data on the piece rate in the time period before managerial performance bonuses were introduced, to predict
the piece rate in the post bonus period. The solid series is based on the specification in Column 2 of Table A1. This
uses the data on the piece rate over all field-days in our working sample and is labeled 'With bonus dummy'.

Table 1: The Design of the Field Experiment
Incentive Scheme in Place
Tier

May 1st - June 26th

June 27th - August 31st

1. Chief Operating Officer

Fixed wages

Fixed wages plus performance bonus

2. Managers

Fixed wages

Fixed wages plus performance bonus

3. Workers

Piece rates

Piece rates

The performance bonus is obtained by managers and the COO if the average productivity of workers on the
field-day is greater than a fixed threshold. This threshold value is the same across all field-days and is set at
the start of the season.

Table 2: Descriptives of Worker Productivity, by Managerial Incentive Scheme
All observations are at the worker-field-day level
Fixed Wages

Performance Bonus

Fixed Wages

(May 1st - June 26th)
(1)

(June 27th - August 31st)
(2)

(May 1st - June 26th)
(3)
(4)

All Workers

All Workers

Selected Workers Fired Workers

Mean

8.37

10.4

8.52

7.69

10.4

Sd, overall

4.29

5.99

4.45

3.44

5.99

Sd, between

2.43

3.35

2.49

2.11

3.35

Sd, within

3.48

4.64

3.58

2.98

4.64

All Workers

All Workers

Mean

7.86

7.85

Sd, overall

5.24

3.51

Sd, between

3.08

2.20

Sd, within

4.21

2.87

Managerial Incentive Scheme, 2003 Season:

Performance Bonus
(June 27th - August 31st)
(5)
Selected Workers

Worker's productivity (kg/hr)

Managerial Incentive Scheme, 2004 Season:
Worker's productivity (kg/hr)

Notes: These figures are based on all workers that are available for work three weeks either side of the change in managerial incentive schemes. Selected workers are defined to be those that pick at least one field-day under both managerial incentive
schemes. Fired workers are only selected to pick when managers are paid fixed wages.

Table 3: Descriptives, by Managerial Incentive Scheme
Means, standard errors in parentheses, and 95% confidence intervals in brackets
Managerial Incentive Scheme
Fixed Wages

Performance Bonus

Worker productivity (kg/hr)

8.37
(.240)
[ 7.89, 8.84 ]

10.4
(.486)
[ 9.47, 11.4 ]

Kilograms picked per field-day

30.2
(.873)
[ 28.4, 31.9 ]

30.4
(1.54)
[ 27.3, 33.4 ]

Hours worked per field-day

3.70
(.169)
[ 3.36, 4.03 ]

3.03
(.157)
[ 2.72, 3.34 ]

Hourly earnings from picking (£/hr)

4.81
(.133)
[ 4.54, 5.07 ]

4.53
(.199)
[ 4.41, 4.93 ]

Piece rate per kilogram picked (£/kg)

.617
(.030)
[ .557, .677 ]

.476
(.016)
[ .445, .507 ]

Number of workers on field-day

79.3
(4.02)
[ 71.4, 87.2 ]

56.4
(2.02)
[ 52.4, 60.4 ]

Number of managers on field-day

5.27
(.231)
[ 4.82, 5.73 ]

3.28
(.075)
[ 3.13, 3.42 ]

Worker-manager ratio

21.3
(2.06)
[ 17.2, 25.4 ]

19.2
(.622)
[ 17.9, 20.4 ]

Notes: Worker productivity, kilos picked per field-day, and hourly earnings are all calculated at the worker-field-day level.
The standard errors on these worker-field-day level variables are clustered at the worker level. Hours worked per field-day,
the piece rate per kilogram picked, the number of managers on the field-day, the number of workers on the field-day, and
the worker-manager ratio, are all calculated at the field-day level.

Table 4: The Effect of the Managerial Incentives on Average Worker Productivity, Field-Day Level
Dependent Variable = Log of average productivity (kilogram picked per hour on field-day)
(1) OLS
Managerial performance bonus dummy

.225***
(.044)

Field life cycle
Average picking experience of workers
Time trend

(2) Controls
.203***
(.074)
-1.35***
(.167)
.284***
(.050)
-.003
(.002)

(3) Field Specific
AR(1)
.196***
(.069)
-1.42***
(.194)
.276***
(.065)
-.002
(.002)

(4) Manager Fixed
Effects
.194***
(.082)
-1.31***
(.177)
.313***
(.062)
-.001
(.002)

Tenure under performance bonus scheme

Field fixed effects
Manager fixed effects
R-squared
Number of field-day observations

(5) Tenure
.190**
(.082)
-1.29***
(.174)
.335***
(.093)
-.003
(.006)
.002
(.005)

No
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

.0986
247

.3873
247

.8264
247

.8746
247

.8759
247

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All continuous variables are in logarithms. OLS regression estimates are reported in Columns 1 and 2. Robust standard errors are calculated. In
the remaining columns AR(1) regression estimates are reported. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression. This allows the error terms to be field specific heteroskedastic,
and contemporaneously correlated across fields. The autocorrelation process is assumed to be specific to each field. Each field-day observation is weighted by the log of the number of workers present. The
managerial performance bonus dummy = 1 when the managerial performance bonus scheme is in place, and 0 otherwise. The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total
number of days the field is picked over the season. Tenure under the performance bonus scheme is defined as the number of field-days the performance bonus has been in place for.

Table 5: The Effect of the Managerial Incentives on the Dispersion of Workers' Productivity, Field-Day Level
Dependent Variable = Log of the coefficient of variation of productivity (kilogram picked per hour on field-day)
Standard errors allow for field specific AR(1)
(1) OLS
Managerial performance bonus dummy

.084***
(.031)

Field life cycle
CV of picking experience of workers
Time trend

(2) Controls
.177***
(.060)
.024
(.150)
-.029
(.081)
-.002
(.001)

(3) Field Specific
AR(1)
.191***
(.058)
.040
(.135)
-.016
(.079)
-.002
(.002)

(4) Manager Fixed
Effects
.317***
(.063)
.208
(.137)
-.082
(.072)
-.001
(.002)

Tenure under performance bonus scheme

Field fixed effects
Manager fixed effects
R-squared
Number of field-day observations

(5) Tenure
.314***
(.065)
.228
(.145)
-.077
(.073)
-.002
(.003)
.001
(.003)

No
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

.0279
247

.0731
247

.5364
247

.5780
247

.5812
247

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All continuous variables are in logarithms. OLS regression estimates are reported in Columns 1 and 2. Robust standard errors are calculated. In the remaining
columns, AR(1) regression estimates are reported. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression. This allows the error terms to be field specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously
correlated across fields. The autocorrelation process is assumed to be specific to each field. Each field-day observation is weighted by the log of the number of workers present. The managerial performance bonus dummy =
1 when the managerial performance bonus scheme is in place, and 0 otherwise. The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. Tenure
under the performance bonus scheme is defined as the number of field-days the performance bonus has been in place for.

Table 6: Further Evidence of a Causal Effect of Managerial Incentives, Field-Day Level
Standard errors allow for field specific AR(1)

Placebo Bonus Based on Date of Change in
Managerial Incentives in 2003 (June 27th)
Average Productivity
(1)

Managerial performance bonus dummy (2003)
Placebo managerial performance bonus dummy (2004)

(2)

.186***
(.074)
-.018
(.099)

.622***
(.109)
.095
(.170)

-1.34***
(.176)

-1.04***
(.218)
-.372
(.461)
-.968***
(.109)

Coefficient of Variation
of Productivity
(3)

(4)

.432***
(.067)
-.355***
(.088)

.378***
(.118)
-.054
(.181)

.342***
(.133)

.054
(.226)
-.843**
(.356)
.346**
(.158)

Placebo Bonus Based on Number of Days Under
Fixed Wages for Managers in 2003 (44 days)
Average Productivity
(5)

(6)

.198***
(.076)
.071
(.099)

.637***
(.110)
-.219
(.214)

-1.34***
(.180)

-.982***
(.211)
.704
(.514)
-1.02***
(.166)

Coefficient of Variation
of Productivity
(7)

(8)

.395***
(.067)
-.463***
(.102)

.324***
(.118)
-.182
(.204)

.274**
(.134)

.114
(.221)
-.766*
(.455)
.240
(.164)

Interactions with field life cycle Managerial performance bonus dummy (2003)
Placebo managerial performance bonus dummy (2004)
Field life cycle

Field fixed effects
Manager fixed effects
Other controls
R-squared
Number of observations

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

.9044
370

.8902
370

.6623
370

.6749
370

.9038
370

.8990
370

.6656
370

.6719
370

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All continuous variables are in logarithms. AR(1) regression estimates are reported. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression. This
allows the error terms to be field specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across fields. The autocorrelation process is assumed to be specific to each field. Each field-day observation is weighted by the log of the
number of workers present. The managerial performance bonus dummy = 1 when the managerial performance bonus scheme is in place, and 0 otherwise. In Columns 1 to 4 the placebo bonus dummy is equal to one after June 27th in
2004, and zero otherwise. In Columns 5 to 8 the placebo bonus dummy is equal to one after the 44th day of the picking season, and zero otherwise. In Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, other controls include the average picking experience of
workers on the field-day, the field life cycle, and a time trend. In Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8, other controls include the coefficient of variation in the picking experience of workers on the field-day, the field life cycle, and a time trend.

Table 7: Quantile Regression Estimates, Worker-Field-Day Level
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour on the field-day)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at field-day level

.1

.25

.33

Quantile
.5

Managerial performance bonus dummy

-.067
(.144)

.026
(.099)

.062
(.092)

.129
(.088)

.186**
(.092)

.233***
(.092)

.319***
(.094)

Field life cycle

-1.50***
(.325)
.276***
(.034)
-.001
(.004)

-1.25***
(.212)
.271***
(.025)
.000
(.002)

-1.23***
(.180)
.248***
(.025)
.001
(.002)

-1.17***
(.177)
.234***
(.021)
.002
(.002)

-1.17***
(.205)
.245***
(.019)
.000
(.002)

-1.19***
(.224)
.254***
(.018)
-.001
(.002)

-.983***
(.256)
.248***
(.019)
-.004
(.003)

Picking experience
Time trend

.66

.75

.9

Field fixed effects
Manager fixed effects
Other controls

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Number of observations

8695

8695

8695

8695

8695

8695

8695

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Bootstrapped standard errors are calculated throughout, allowing for clustering at the field-day level. These
are based on 1000 replications. All continuous variables are in logarithms. The regressions are based on those workers selected to pick at least once under managerial
performance bonuses. The managerial performance bonus dummy is one when mangers are paid according to the performance bonus, and zero otherwise. The field life
cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season.

Table 8: Selection into the Workforce
A: Productivity
Average productivity of workers (kg/hr) by worker type and managerial incentive scheme
Standard deviation in parentheses
Selected-In Workers

Selected-Out Workers

Fired Workers

Fixed Wages

9.03
(3.03)

7.45
(2.09)

6.79
(2.15)

Performance Bonus

11.11
(3.66)

7.35
(2.50)

B: Unemployment Rate
Average unemployment rate of workers by worker type and managerial incentive scheme
Standard deviation in parentheses
Selected-In Workers

Selected-Out Workers

Fired Workers

Fixed Wages

.037
(.052)

.089
(.122)

.187
(.186)

Performance Bonus

.059
(.060)

.146
(.180)

.340
(.372)

Notes: These figures are based on the sample of all 197 workers available to pick fruit. Selected-in workers are defined to be those that are in the top quartile of
the distribution of number of field-days picked post-bonus. This corresponds to 77 or more field-day observations on which the worker picks post-bonus.
Selected-out workers are defined to be those workers in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of number of field-days picked post-bonus. Fired workers
are those who never pick after the introduction of the performance bonus. There are 67 fired workers. The unemployment rate for a worker is the share of days in
which the worker is present on the farm but is not assigned to any task.

Table 9: The Effect of Managerial Incentives on the Selection of Workers
Conditional logit estimates
Column 1: Dependent Variable = 1 if worker i is chosen to pick on day t in main site, 0 otherwise
Column 2: Dependent Variable = 1 if worker i is unemployed on day t, 0 otherwise
Odd ratios reported, standard errors in parentheses

Managerial performance bonus dummy
Total yield in site 1
Total yield in site 2
Number of workers available to pick fruit

Log-likelihood
Number of observations

Probability of Being
Selected to Pick

Probability of Being
Unemployed

(1)

(2)

.771***
(.067)
2.26***
(.090)
.879***
(.028)
.377***
(.017)

1.23*
(.138)
.756***
(.034)
.829***
(.029)
1.15***
(.053)

-5208.29
15551

-3934.14
11284

Notes: *** denotes that the odd ratio is significantly different from one at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% levels. These regressions are based on the sample of all 197
workers available to pick fruit. Conditional logit estimates are reported where observations are grouped by worker. All continuous variables are divided by their
standard deviations so that one unit increase can be interpreted as increase by one standard deviation. "Total yield" on the site is the total kilograms of the fruit
picked on the site-day. The "number of workers available to pick fruit" is the total number of individuals that are on the farm that day and are available for fruit
picking. Worker i is defined to be unemployed on day t if, conditional on not being selected to pick, she is not assigned to any non-picking tasks. The sample is
smaller in Column 2 since the sample is based on workers that are not selected into any picking tasks on the day.

Table A1: Predicting the Piece Rate
Dependent Variable = Piece rate on field-day (£ per kilogram picked)
Standard errors allow for field specific AR(1)
(1) Pre Bonus Period (2) Entire Sample
Field life cycle
Average picking experience of workers
SD of picking experience of workers
Time trend
Rainfall (mm)
Minimum temperature (Celsius)
Share of workers that are women
Share of workers that play sports
Share of workers that came for earnings
Number of managers
Number of workers

.366***
(.131)
.004
(.003)
-.006
(.004)
-.003
(.005)
-.026***
(.004)
-.011**
(.006)
.393***
(.148)
-.711***
(.224)
.016
(.214)
-.029
(.062)
-.0004
(.0004)

.503***
(.064)
.001
(.001)
-.004**
(.002)
-.003
(.002)
-.005
(.004)
-.006*
(.003)
.251***
(.097)
-.336**
(.152)
.127
(.139)
-.173
(.153)
-.001***
(.0003)
-.124***
(.040)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

.7694
140

.8008
245

Managerial performance bonus dummy

Field fixed effects
Manager fixed effects
R-squared
Number of observations

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All continuous variables are in logarithms. AR(1)
regression estimates are reported. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression.
This allows the error terms to be field specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across fields. The
autocorrelation process is assumed to be specific to each field. The rainfall and minimum temperature measures
correspond to a 0900-0900 time frame. The `play sports' variable is defined to be one if the worker reports playing
sports at least once a month, and zero otherwise. The `came for earnings' variable is defined to be one if the worker
reports one reason why they came to the farm is because the pay is good, and zero otherwise. Other options were `to
travel and meet new people', `to learn English', and `it is part of my university course'. These variables are then
averaged across the workers on the field-day. The piece rate data is missing for two field-days operated in the period
before managerial performance bonuses were introduced.

